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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Economists now prescribing to the authorities in Eastern Europe,  who are faced with the daunting task 
of  transition to free markets, disagree about fundamentals such as the sequencing of reform measures, 
whether a 'big bang' or a series of incremental  measures is  most effective and the techniques of 
privatisation.  However they generally are agreed that a first priority is the  use of prices in resource 
allocation, and, given the difficulties  and delays in establishing free internal markets, recommend im-
porting an  international price structure. This requires free,  decentralised decisions over imports and 
exports, a meaningful  exchange rate and access to foreign exchange. 
The choice of the exchange rate mechanism: When it gets to the  issue of the mechanics of the 
exchange rate regime, the brief  consensus breaks down with some arguing for an  irrevocably fixed 
exchange rate, and others who find this prescription totally unrealistic. This study takes the second view 
on the grounds that not only are high and unpredictable inflation rates an almost inevitable consequence 
of the transition process, or at least of the inevitable policy mistakes or misjudgments involved in that 
process, but also the lack of the information necessary to decide  the long-term 'equilibrium exchange 
rate'. 
Arguments for pegging  ... : In any event, unless they adopt free floating, the authorities must choose an 
exchange rate or basket  to which to peg their currency, whether the peg is 'irrevocable',  subject to 
periodic and discrete changes or to a crawling peg arrangement. Even in the latter two cases, exchange 
rate predictability between discrete parity changes (or changes in the rate of  crawl) are important micro-
economic conditions for the development of  export and import-competing sectors. This is the theoretical 
argument underlying a currency peg in the form of a  trade-weighted basket. 
... and pegging to the ecu: The case for a trade-weighted basket  to reduce exchange rate risk at the 
micro-economic level is  powerful but there are other economic and  political considerations.  These 
overwhelmingly support a peg to the ecu for the countries under consideration -the  CSFR, Hungary and 
Poland. An  ecu peg would have particular benefits. It would, 
- signal a credible inflation target. The average inflation rate  for tradeable goods equal to that of the 
European Community would  be a medium-term goal but clearly in line with the medium-term  objective 
of Community and ERM (or EMU) membership; 
- bring associated benefits through increased trade invoicing  and settlement in ecus. This will develop 
anyway, both in and  outside the EC, as EMU approaches and regulations on the use of  the ecu are 
removed. But an  ecu peg, combined with the use of the  ecu as a vehicle currency, would minimise 
exchange risk for  traders and further the development of the export sectors in  the  Eastern Europe 
countries; 
- open further opportunities for swap agreements and collaboration in other policy areas with EC central 
banks; 
- eventually, when the ecu becomes a fully-fledged currency in  its own right, lead to a simplification and 
streamlining  of the  intervention  process,  which  could  not  be obtained  with  any other  basket of 
currencies; -4-
-most importantly, give witness to the determination of the  Eastern European countries to meet the 
required economic disciplines for full membership of the European Community. 
A major problem with the rapid implementation of an ecu  peg in the CSFR, Hungary and Poland is the 
absence of  forward  markets in foreign exchange in those countries. At present traders or investors 
have no means of  hedging their foreign exchange exposures - hence the adoption of  basket pegs which 
reflect the use of denomination of currencies in current account  transadions. However the countries 
concerned have plans to introduce forward markets - though in some cases spot interbank markets do 
not yet exist. 
There would be clear advantages if a number of ex-CMEA countries  were to adopt a peg to the ecu in 
that it would enhance exchange  rate stability between those countries. This would be particularly true 
were the new Commonwealth of  Independent States to disintegrate as a single currency area. Otherwise 
exchange rate  instability is likely to further depress trade within the Commonwealth and between the 
Commonwealth and Eastern Europe-though,  of  course, general pegging to the ecu does not eliminate 
the uncertainty associated with parity adjustments. 
Quantitative analysis suggests that the loss in micro-economic exchange rate stability associated with 
an ecu rather than a trade-weighted basket peg is limited. This cost will diminish as the Eastern Europe 
countries become further integrated into the  world trading system and their geographical structure of 
trade  becomes closer to that of  Western European countries. 
The Crawling Peg mechanism is briefly examined. Poland has  adopted a crawling peg - the zloty is 
depreciated by a faxed,  pre-announced amount each day. Though the regime has helped an  informal 
but efficient foreign exchange market to develop - there  is still no interbank market - it is at the cost of 
a inflexible labour market. In order to keep inflationary expectations under control, draconian rules have 
been adopted to limit wage increases. 
The report also looks at the experience of  other countries in  pegging to currency baskets. The most 
relevant is that of  Sweden, Norway and Finland who have formally adopted pegs to the ecu. The lessons 
from their experiences are that an  ecu peg is no panacea  for underlying macro-economic problems 
generating exchange rate  instability, that there is a danger that, at least in the early  days. the interest 
of speculators will be attracted, and that  policy credibility may be threatened if an untenable parity is 
initially adopted. rinland and Sweden have already delivered some  salutary warnings to future ecu 
peggers. In general, however, the countries in question, the CSFR, Hungary and Poland, have much to 
gain from pegging their currencies to the ecu, though first they  must improve the efficiency and scope 
of their foreign exchange  markets. -5-
Chapter 1. Introduction 
Roughly two years on from the astonishing events which put an end  to almost two generations under 
communism, the countries of Eastern Europe are still faced with a daunting task. Some progress  has 
been made in dismantling the institutions of the command  economy. Relatively little progress has been 
made in establishing  private ownership or competitive markets for fadors or goods. 
VVtJile the need to introduce free and competitive markets is  largely undisputed, the problems in doing 
so are enormous. Exposure to international markets has been considered a valuable shortcut to a more 
rational domestic price structure. To be effective that requires price liberalisation, decentralisation of 
import and export decisions, a simple, preferably single-rate tariff structure and a meaningful exchange 
rate. 
This report is concerned with the appropriate exchange rate system for the countries of  Eastern Europe. 
It focuses on Poland,  Czechoslovakia (or the CSFR, the Czech and Slovak Federal  Republic, as it is 
now officially called) and Hungary though some  attention is paid to the emerging situation in the new 
Commonwealth  of Independent States,  the  old  Soviet  Union,  in  particular  the implications of its 
disintegration into separate currency  areas, and the institutional arrangements designed to cope with 
that, on the Eastern European countries. 
Geonomenclature: The CSFR, Hungary and Poland as a whole are  neither geographically- Prague is 
west of Vienna - nor culturally in Eastern Europe. There is an argument for referring to  the three as 
Central Europe. 
'In Prague and Budapest, the idea of Central Europe continued to be cherished by 
consenting adults in private, but from the public sphere it vanished as completely as it 
had in "the West". The post-Yalta order dictated a strict and single dichotomy. Western 
Europe implicitly accepted this dichotomy by subsuming under the label Eastern Europe 
all those parts of  historic Central, East Central, and South-eastern Europe that after 1945 
came under Soviet domination. The EEC completed the semantic trick by arrogating to 
itself the unqualified title Europe' (Garton Ash 1989, 161) 
But in referring to the CSFR, Hungary and Poland as Central Europe, two problems arise. Central Europe 
may not appear an appropriate designation for a large stretch of  Poland. Cracow was  an outpost of  the 
Habsburg Empire but Warsaw most certainly was  not, though the Empire is only one of many ways of 
delineating  Central Europe. Secondly Central Europe as an historical entity  embraces at least Austria, 
parts of Germany, Slovenia and  Croatia, and possibly, more. Also for some it could have a  resonance 
of the pre-first World War concept of Mitteleuropa  espoused by Friedrich Naumann and others. 
An alternative generic name for our group of  countries would be East Central Europe but that is clumsy. 
It seems best to continue to refer to them as the CSFR, Hungary and Poland -though that is clumsy too. 
When discussing these three countries together with  the other non-Soviet countries subjected to Soviet 
hegemony, I use the term Eastern Europe, fully aware that it implies a  dichotomy that is no longer valid. 
But the economic legacy of that dichotomy is only too apparent. Anyway there is no obviously  better 
alternative. 
Academic insights: The selection of the appropriate exchange rate  system for different economic 
circumstances has been the subject  of academic speculation and research since the 1950s. As in -6-
economics exam papers, the questions have remained broadly the  same. The answers have changed 
with the prevailing orthodoxy. The  consensus in favour of 'free floating' up to at least the end of  the 
1970s' was associated with the emphasis on market solutions. Associated with the view that interference 
by the authorities in  the foreign exchange market could only lead to distortions in that and other markets, 
and inevitably result in some misallocation of  resources, was the comforting factor that  free-floating meant 
that internal policy could be pursued free of any  balance of payments constraint. 
This orthodoxy has now been replaced by a greater eclecticism.  The volatility of exchange rates in the 
1980s has  led  to a  new  emphasis on the need for stability among both  the developed and  the 
developing countries. Thus the argument that control over the monetary aggregates is so critical that it 
must b8 maximised by a  freely floating exchange rate is no longer often heard. Indeed  the monetary 
aggregates are no longer generally considered as the only credible policy instruments. 
Now the accent is on the rOle of  the exchange rate, either as an  active policy instrument for targeting real 
macro-economic variables, or as a 'nominal anchor'. Corden (1990) drew attention to  these alternative 
objectives. Emphasis on real targets, such as the level of  activity or  the growth rate, shows a confidence 
in  the exchange rate as a policy instrument. The authorities have  control over the real exchange rate, 
whether because of  time lags or imperfections in world markets, changes in the nominal exchange rate 
will not be immediately offset by changes in domestic  prices relative to foreign prices. This implies that 
an activist  approach to exchange rate policy is possible. 
On the other hand the nominal anchor view is consistent with two  alternative positions.  Firstly the 
authorities cannot influence  the real exchange rate, or, at least, can do so for too short a  period to 
achieve anything useful because domestic prices will  rapidly adjust to offset any change in the nominal 
rate. Or that,  though changes in the nominal rate may have real impacts, they  should not be used 
because the anti-inflationary gain from adopting exchange rate fixity outweighs any positive effects on 
the real economy. In other words control over inflation is the overriding objective of  policy and, since the 
use of  the exchange  rate as a policy instrument might, at times, compromise this objective, it should be 
totally shunned. 
In either case the inference is that the exchange rate should be irrevocably fixed to one commodity, such 
as gold, the currency  of  a major trading partner, such as the US dollar, or a basket of commodities or 
currencies, eschewing any use of the exchange rate  for policy while accepting arbitrary relative price 
changes as the inevitable cost. Of  course there are any number of intermediate approaches. This report 
will argue in favour of  a fixed  but adjustable rate, in particular for the adoption of  an adjustable peg to the 
ecu. 
The EMU Treaty agreed in Maastricht in December 1991 binds the  Community to becoming, in 1999 
at the latest, an Economic and  Monetary Union 
1
• It establishes the ecu as the single currency of that 
Union. The three countries with which this report is  mainly concerned, the CSFR, Hungary and Poland, 
have all expressed the intention to become full members of the Community and  of the EMU. Perhaps 
the single most important reason for those  countries to peg their cornices to the ecu is to facilitate, and 
perhaps expedite, their membership. 
1
For a discussion of the Maasbicht Treaty provisions and their relevance to the ecu, see Louw 1992. -7-
Chapter 2. Preliminaries 
1. Convertibility and foreign exchange markets 
The r61e of  the exchange rate: Convertibility and an effective exchange rate are different sides of  the 
same coin. In a market  economy the exchange rate performs the critical function of determining the 
relative prices of  traded and non-traded goods.  or more precisely 1radeables' and 'non-tradeables•. and 
thus the  'openness• of the economy or degree to which it is dependent on  international trade. Where 
economic agents are free to import and  to export. the exchange rate will determine whether any par-
ticular good or service (which can be traded across international frontiers) can be bought more cheaply 
from  domestic or from foreign  producers or can  be sold  more profitably to domestic or to  foreign 
consumers after the relevant prices  are adjusted for import tariffs or export taxes  and  appropriate 
transport. insurance  and other differential incidental costs. 
In the process of transition from a centralised command economy  to a market economy. a correctly 
valued exchange rate and a free regime as regards imports means that domestic producers are subject 
to foreign competition. The 'imported' price system can  supply the signals for the allocation of  resources 
(i) between  domestic production and imports and (ii) within the domestic  economy. that the domestic 
market cannot yet supply. Competition  from the world market can largely substitute for internal com-
petition among domestic producers. 
The exchange rate must be realistic,  that is it must reflect the  competitiveness of exports and the 
elasticity of demand for imports in the short run so as to avoid generating a current account problem. 
Then it must be effective in transmitting price  signals. This implies several subconditions. Firstly there 
should only be one exchange rate. Secondly domestic prices must  be allowed to clear excess demand 
or supply, sometimes known as  •commodity convertibility•. Thirdly economic agents must be able to buy 
and sell foreign exchange freely at the current rate and  not be subject to rationing or other restrictions. 
That is, the  domestic currency must be convertible. 
Three broad types of convertibility should be distinguished: 
- domestic (or internal) convertibility where only residents can  buy and sell the domestic currency for 
'hard' currencies and then  only for a limited range of current account transactions; 
- current account convertibility where both residents and non-residents can trade but they can do  this for 
all current transactions. Article VII. Section 2(a) of  the IMF Articles of  Agreement defines the concept as 
•  ... no member shall. without the approval of  the Fund, impose restrictions on the making of  payments and 
transfers for current inter-national transactions'; 
- full convertibility where foreign currency is freely available  for capital account transactions, including 
foreign direct or  portfolio investment. the transfer abroad of personal financial  assets or purchases of 
foreign property. 
Full convertibility would not be appropriate for any Eastern  European (EE) country at the present stage. 
'There is all the  difference between tolerating  retail use of a parallel market by households wanting to 
place some of their assets abroad (despite  the premium they have to pay for foreign exchange). and 
facilitating the wholesale export of savings by all<~wing enterprises and fmancial intermediaries to buy 
foreign assets with  no financial penalty' (Williamson. 1991a. 379). -8-
There is the alternative argument that capital account convertibility could give rise to an exchange rate 
appreciation. Seabright comments on the 'broad consensus among academics and policymakers on the 
so-called  "tariffs-first"  approach to external  liberalisation.  The tariffs-first  approach  consists  of the 
recommendation that capital account convertibility be delayed until the export sector has expanded under 
the impact of trade  liberalisation,  for fear that an  inflow of capital seeking  profitable investment 
opportunities will make real exchange rate  appreciation unavoidable' (1991, 3). 
Even domestic convertibility is a major advance on past regimes:  it 
- allows international price signals to determine the allocation  of  resources, at least provided that there 
is relatively free  trade; 
- means that domestic enterprises, even where national monopolies, will have to compete with foreign 
suppliers; 
-assists in determining which enterprises are viable, given that privatisation takes time (and clearly more 
time that was  earlier envisaged). Even before privatisation it will help the  authorities to assess the 
competitiveness of enterprises and  apply appropriate budget constraints; 
-encourages  foreign direct investment (as well as portfolio investment) which could be a significant factor 
in  privatisation  and  restructuring.  True,  EE  governments without  domestic  convertibility  are  now 
guaranteeing the right to repatriate profits and  capital,  but even then there is a danger that direct 
investment  from  abroad will be concentrated  in  export industries, where the  inward flow of hard 
currencies makes repatriation easier. A foreign exchange market will give investors extra confidence and 
encourage participation in joint ventures and a wider sectoral  spread of  foreign investment; 
- economises on bureaucracy and reduces corruption; 
-allows the exchange rate to serve as a monetary target. I  shall come back to that shortly. 
Convertibility and a realistic exchange rate are not sufficient.  First the resource allocation process will 
only become rational  when prices are liberalised and  come to reflect the relative factors costs  of 
production. In command economies signals in the form of  market-determined prices, which reflect relative 
scarcities and lead to the efficient allocation of resources have  been generally non-existent or at best 
weak and delayed. In particular subsidies must be largely phased out. Secondly if the  foreign price 
system is to serve as a shortcut vehicle to introducing a rational price system, it must not be distorted by 
significantly differential tariff rates on different product groups.  Thirdly the threat of hyperinflation must 
be avoided which means  dealing with the monetary overhang and avoiding monetary financing of 
growing budget deficits. Fourthly the establishment of  property rights and privatisation are essential 
ingredients  though privatisation now appears to be more complex than had been  envisaged. 
The sequencing issue: There has been some debate as to whether convertibility should be introduced 
at an early stage in the  process of reform, even at the outset as did Poland, or later on  when the 
preconditions for a credible exchange rate are established. Piecemeal re~rm  is likely to fall apart unless 
the order in which reforms are undertaken is well designed. This is the  so-called sequencing problem. 
Poland and the CSFR introduced convertibility early on in the belief  that it increases the credibility of  the 
reform package,  at home and abroad. In fact it may be necessary to add the 'critical mass' to the reform (2) 
-9-
package that credibility requires  (Portes 1991a). Moreover postponing convertibility postpones the 
approximation to world prices. Internally free prices alone will  not lead to optimal allocation between 
domestic and foreign  production, or the optimal use of foreign exchange receipts. Nor  can this be 
effectively achieved by retaining vestiges of  the command economy such as foreign currency auctions. 
Postponing convertibility may also lead to a distorted exchange  rate, possibly increasingly distorted as 
long as convertibility  is delayed. The eventual shift to an equilibrium exchange rate  will be extremely 
difficult for a large number of enterprises  where a substantial appreciation is involved. Alternatively, 
where the distortions lead to an above-equilibrium exchange rate,  the costs will be borne by the growth 
rate, and possibly by  shortages of basic goods and social unrest. 
Critics of  sequencing on the grounds that they only serve as a justification for procrastination and timidity 
(IMF.  1990; Blommestein et al.,  1990) ignore important interdependencies. Certain  changes need to 
precede others or  they will not work. Portes (  1990 and 1991 a) emphasises the importance of  robustness 
- the  chosen sequence of reforms must be able to withstand external  shocks and errors in assessing 
behavioural responses - and  credibility. 
Convertibility in the CSFR, Hungary and Poland: These countries have all introduced a form of  what 
may be generally classified as domestic convertibility, though the details vary substantially between the 
three countries. In each case the currency is pegged to a basket, though initially the Polish zloty was tied 
to the  dollar. 
Poland was the first of the three countries to introduce convertibility. It did so along with a number of 
radical measures {price liberalisation, the elimination of  export subsidies etc.) in its 'big bang' of  January 
1,  1990. At the same time the right to  engage in foreign trade was extended to all with no need for 
authorisation. Quantitative import restrictions were completely  abolished and a unified customs tariff 
established. Export quotas  were cut by almost a half. 
The exchange rate was made one of the two formal anchors of the  economy, the other being a near 
freeze on nominal incomes through a swinging tax  on wage increases (Oiechowski and Oles, 1991). The 
zloty became convertible for most current account purposes  for residents though zlotys held by non-
residents, even where  accepted for exports to Poland, were not, and still are not, convertible. The zloty 
was pegged to the US dollar - it had previously been set in terms of a basket of currencies - on the 
grounds that more than 50 percent of  Polish trade was denominated  in dollars, it was the currency most 
commonly used in foreign exchange transactions between individuals, and it was relatively  weak at the 
time. 
Export proceeds have to be sold to the licensed banks, who in  tum resell them to the central bank, 
though households can hold foreign exchange assets. The National Bank supplies the commercial banks 
with unlimited amounts of  convertible currency for imports, though enterprises, with a central bank permit, 
may also  hold accounts with foreign banks. There is no interbank market in  foreign exchange
2
• 
Other foreign exchange transactions have also been liberalised but larger capital transadions or those 
with longer maturities still require authorisation. 
2 
A secondary foreign exchange market exists through the Kantors -foreign exchange dealers who supply the needs of 
tourists and small businesses.  The central bank intervenes to keep the unofficial rates for hard currencies close to the official rates. 
For other currencies, including the rouble, the forint and the koruna, rates are detemined In a free -If  thin - market. - 10-
Since January 1990 the zloty has been devalued on several occasions (though it was held at its initial 
dollar par  for  the first year). It is now pegged to a basket of  five currencies with weights roughly reflecting 
the importance of  the currencies used  to denominate trade. Since October 1991 it has been subject to 
a  'pre-announced crawling peg'
3
• 
The CSFR's big  bang  took place a year later on January 1,  1991.  It introduced current account 
convertibility for enterprises though as in Poland, foreign exchange balances must be sold to the banks, 
who provide foreign exchange for imports. The rules  about holding foreign exchange accounts by 
enterprises or  firms appear somewhat stricter than in Poland. Residents, in distinction to enterprises, are 
permitted to hold foreign exchange accounts. 
The exchange rate is pegged to a basket of the five hard currencies with the greatest share in the 
currencies used to denominate balance of  payments transactions". Together  they cover  about 80 percent 
of those transactions. 
The commercial banks (16 in the CSFR) buy and sell foreign exchange which they sell to or obtain from 
the central bank or from  each other, with the central bank clearing the difference between  supply and 
demand each day. Thus there is an operating interbank  market with liquidity rules governing the ratio 
between each  bank's foreign exchange assets and its liabilities. Capital flows  are controlled through a 
different ratio governing shortterm assets and liabilities (less than a one-year maturity) and the need  to 
consult with the Central Bank over longer maturities. 
Trade was liberalised at  the same  time as convertibility was introduced though rules postponing payments 
for non-investment imports were established and a 20 percent surcharge on imports of consumer goods 
was levied.These regulations have been considerably relaxed over the year - largely in response to a 
better  trade balance than predicted. 
Hungary: Hungary's approach to convertibility. as its approach to  the whole gamut of  reforms. has been 
incremental. Imports have been largely if  gradually liberalised - 90 percent are now free of  all licensing 
requirements - and now the forint is generally  convertible for domestic enterprises involved in foreign 
trade (Bokros 1991 ). Convertibility has even been extended to some capital transactions involving direct 
and portfolio investments abroad. 
However domestic non-financial corporations may not hold foreign  currency accounts and are obliged 
to sell their foreign currency  receipts to the banks. The banks trade foreign currencies exclusively with 
the central bank. Hungarian non-corporate residents have very limited access to hard currencies and are 
barred  from holding hard currency accounts. 
3 
The percentage weights are as follows : US dollar 45 percent. Deutschemark 35 percent. pound sterling 10 percent. 
Swiss franc 5 percent and French franc 5 percent Each banking day the zloty ia depreciated by 9 zlotys per dolar. Firat the value 
of  the zloty is calculated in the nonnal way using the day's exchange rates and the basket weights and expressed In any currency. 
This is then multiplied by 11,1 00/(11,100+9n) where n is the number of  banking days since the beginning of  the crawl (October 14, 
1991) and 11,100 zlotys per US dolarwaa the exchange rate when the basket was established on May 16, 1991. 
4 
The weights are as follows: the Deutschemark -45.52 percent. the United States doHar-31.34 percent. The Austrian 
schiiHng - 12.35 percent. the Swiss franc-6.55 percent and the pound stel'iing 4.24 percent -II-
The authorities in Hungary are in the process of establishing an  interbank market in foreign exchange. 
It is expected, though not  officially announced, that, in the near future, there will be  moves to a liberal 
system in which residents and enterprises will be free to hold foreign currency accounts. The central bank 
will  not be obliged to supply foreign exchange to traders but that  will be left to a competitive foreign 
exchange market. Thus it is  probable that Hungary will leap-frog the other two countries in  reaching a 
more market-based system. 
Concerns about the need to have sufficient hard currency available for servicing the extensive foreign 
debt- and worries about  the emergence of a parallel currency have slowed down the process  towards 
converti~lity but, now in practice, the situation in  Hungary is not markedly different from that in Poland 
or the  CSFR. All three countries are committed to extending convertibility, first to presently excluded 
current account operations.  In all three· countries progress in this direction depends on a  comfortable 
stock of hard currency reserves. but. most important.  confidence in the currency based on a credible 
exchange rate and  control of inflation. 
Lack of  a forward market in foreign exchange: One of the main  problems in moving to an ecu peg 
is the lack of an adequate forward market in foreign exchange in the three countries. Economic  agents 
buying or selling abroad are required to enter contracts  to pay or receive sums of money denominated 
in a foreign currency. So as not to have to incur exchange rate risk (which might  deter them from the 
whole transaction).· they will often want to  buy or sell the foreign exchange forward at the prevailing for-
ward price for that currency.  For example a Polish exporter expecting to receive dollars in three  months 
time might want to sell the dollars forward at today's  three month forward rate, but without a forward 
market he cannot  do that. A peg to the ecu would  in~roduce an exchange risk for all transactions no 
denominated in ecus. 
The  system  of pegging  to a basket which  reflects  the currency  denomination of current  account 
transactions minimises the exchange risk for all transactors as a whole, though any particular individual, 
say the Polish exporter to the U.S., is only protected to the extent of  the weight of  the dollar in the basket. 
(There is no protection against the risk of revaluations or devaluations in  the domestic currency relative 
to the peg. Here we are only concerned with risks between formal realignments). 
In the CSFR there is currently some dispute about the establishment of a forward market between the 
central and the commercial banks. The commercial banks are prepared to operate such a  market but 
want to be able to ofnoad any risk in their hard currency exposure on to the central bank. The central bank 
naturally  is disinclined to accept a situation where it becomes .'risktaker  of last resort'. 
In  Hungary just that situation  prevails.  There  is  an  interbank  market  in foreign  exchange. and  the 
commercial banks enter forward  contracts to enable importers or exporters to hedge their exposures. 
However the central bank is ready to assume the forward  risk at preannounced rates. In other countries 
these arrangements have led to severe losses for the central banks and. eventually the facilities had to 
be discontinued (Quirk et al. 1991). 
In Poland an interbank spot market is still some distance away.  let alone a forward market. The National 
Bank of Poland does not  quote forward rates, so that traders have no access to hedging  facilities. 
However in all three countries there is a full appreciation of the importance of establishing free forward 
foreign exchange markets. The unwillingness of  commercial banks to move more quickly to some extent - 12-
reflects nervousness about new forms of  risk, but also reflects a shortage of personnel competent in 
these areas, a lack of computer systems and other technical  facilities. However considerable progress 
is being made in setting up dealing rooms and in the training of staff with the help  of  Western banks. It 
is likely that there will be much more willingness to participate in these markets in the near future. 
The lack of  efficient markets for hedging foreign exchange exposure will slow down growth in the volume 
of trade of Eastern  Europe with the West, and, thus. the rational integration of these countries into the 
European,  and the world, trading system.  Such  a market also means a reduced demand for hard 
currency balances as they do not need to be held for hedging purposes.  Most important. when hedging 
is not feasible, the credibility of the current rate of exchange takes on greater significance. Uncertainties 
about future exchange rates are likely to become  major obstacles to accepting exposures in foreign 
currencies.  This is one explanation of the decline in intra-EE trade over the  last three years. 
2. Payments and clearing 
The decline of  trade among the former CMEA: It has generally been  accepted that the switch from 
transferable roubles (TRs) to hard currencies as the vehicle currency for trade between erstwhile CMEA 
members has contributed to the major collapse in that trade.  It is difficult to determine the extent of  the 
changes in the  volume of trade - valuation problems render the data difficult to  compare - but, in the 
case of  trade between the Soviet Union and  the EE countries. it seems clear that the decline has been 
severe  (ECE 1991). 
In the case of  trade between the CSFR, Hungary and Poland the problem is not simply one of  shortage 
of hard currencies. It was suggested earlier that foreign exchange risk could be a significant reason for 
the decline in intra-EE trade since 1988. But there are other explanations. the most important being the 
recession throughout Eastern Europe ar:-d  the Independent States.  Thirdly under the CMEA system 
efforts were made to balance trade bilaterally. with TRs serving both as an accounting currency and  as 
a settlements currency for residual imbalances. Any hard currency could now  fill these two functions. But. 
in the case of  the CSFR, Hungary and Poland, trade is no longer administered  centrally and the central 
bank biJateral balancing process no  longer takes place. In  addition the interbank markets in foreign 
exchange are either non-existent or primitive. As a result a greater stock of  hard currencies are required 
for any given level of  transactions. The situation would be worse had the need for  hard currencies not 
been limited by the use of both national currencies (mainly for CSFR-Hungarian trade but to a limited 
extent  trade between those countries and Poland) and barter (which may have increased but data are 
not readily available)
5
• The explanation for the decline in trade between Eastern Europe and the  old 
Soviet Union is probably as much the breakdown in the production and distribution system in the latter 
as the requirement of settlement in hard currencies
8
• 
The shortage of hard currencies is  likely to be a greater problem  in trade of the remaining Eastern 
European countries, Bulgaria and Romania, as well as Mongolia, Cuba and Vietnam. Table 1 shows the 
percentage de<?line in the most relevant bilateral trade flows  between 1987 and 1990. 
5
The use of barter does not necessarily imply a shortage of  the wherewithal for  monetary settlement It  could reflect well-
established inter-enterprise barter anangements that have worked well in the past It could also ·reflect tax evasion. 
6 
Settlement using the EE countries' accumulated stocks of transferable roubles for imports from the Soviet Union, up to 
a certain value in 1991 and for products restricted to an 'Indicative Hsf, was agreed, but here problems of supply, I.e. non-anival, 
after a contract has been signed, have meant these balances have hardly been drawn down. -13-
Table 1: Change in Trade Flows in Eastern Europe, 1987 to 1990,  (percent decline in dollar exports) 
From/To  USSR  Czech.  Hungary  Poland 
ussR·  -46  -42  -41  -35 
Czech.  -43  -23  -32 
Hungary  -46  -18  -52 
Romania  -53  -70  -52  -82 
a:  including USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Cuba, E. Germany, Mongolia  and N. Korea 
Source; Dornbusch (1991), compiled from IMF data 
Table 1 may exaggerate the loss in intra-EE trade consequent on  the breakup of the CMEA. Recent 
trade flows  may be significantly  under-recorded.  There has  been  a  substantial  reduction  in  the 
bureaucracy associated with foreign trade and greater freedom on the part of  the individual enterprises. 
It is likely that many  deals are simply not recorded. This is probably especially true  of barter trade. 
Moreover the valuation of 1987 trade flows in  dollar terms presents enormous difficulties, since intra-EE 
trade was essentially based on a sophisticated barter system. Different  exchange rates were used for 
different products but these were accounting devices rather than reflections of relative domestic prices. 
The trade between EE countries, excluding the Independent States,  was small in absolute terms. The 
geographical specialisation that characterised the republics of the Soviet Union was absent in  Eastern 
Europe. Thus the reductions in trade between the CSFR, Hungary and Poland could largely be explained 
by the new opportunities to import from the West and the drive to export to the  West. 
In any event, at present, in the CSFR, Hungary and Poland a  shortage of hard currencies per se (as 
opposed to the usual  balance of payments constraints) is not considered a critical  obstacle to intra-EE 
trade. None of  the governments has been  forced to und~  steps  -taken. towards convertibility. though the 
CSFR and Hungary are being cautious about the timing of  future  steps in this direction. 
However the emerging situation in the Independent States could  change the picture radically. As Table 
1 indicates trade between  the old Soviet Union and the EE countries has declined more than that within 
Eastern Europe itself. As far as Soviet exports are  concerned, this reflects less a shortage of hard 
.currencies among  the EE countries that a breakdown in supply in the Soviet Union.  The EE countries 
are anxious to prevent any further erosion of their trade with the Independent States, and, if  possible, to 
rebuild earlier trade flows. The CSFR, Hungary and Poland might consider  joining an 'Eastern Payments 
Union (EAPU)' (as Williamson, 1991 b, calls it), along with the Independent States and other EE countries 
if this appeared a promising route. 
The proposal for an Eastern European Payments Union (EEPU): The  proposal stems from the 
argument that trade between CMEA countries has collapsed through lack of  a proper payments system. 
As a result manufacturers cannot obtain raw materials, spare parts or  the machinery they need. Now  that 
the transferable  rouble has been replaced by hard currencies; a payments union  would be valuable in 
economising on  hard currencies reserves.  Eac~·  · member country would only have to settle overall - 14-
payments  balances over any period with the entire membership rather than  with each  individual 
member. 
A EEPU can be seen as a way of protecting a measure of mulilateral trade in a situation of limited 
convertibility. (In fad j)ecause of  the ineffiCiency of  the old Comecon system, most trade was bilaterally 
managed, but the purpose was at least a mulilateral clearing system). Even under Poland's present 
domestic convertibility. an exporter from another EE country cannot demand hard currency payment for 
his zlotys. A EEPU would allow unlimited credit between settlements and only the net balances  would 
require settlement in hard currencies at the settlement  dates. 
However even prior to the end of  the transferable rouble system  there was a reluctance on the part of 
the EE countries to get  .together and  discuss the organisation of a  EEPU.  There seemed to  be 
compelling arguments against the proposal. It would tend to  support the continuation of the obsolete 
pattern of trade whereby  (mainly) Russian energy goods and raw materials are exchanged  against 
generally shoddy manufactures from  Eastern  Europe.  It  would  delay the exposure of certain  EE 
industries to international prices and postpone the 'cold shower of  competition' from  the West. It would 
delay the rapid  integration of Eastern  Europe  into the world financial markets and  slow down the 
emergence of foreign exchange and other financial markets. 
The breakup of the Soviet Union has brought the issue of a payments union back into the limelight. If 
some or all of the  republics start to issue their own  currencies,  a payments union  (or payments 
agreement  if the word  'union' smacks  too  much  of  Soviet  centralism)  could  make an  important 
contribution to maintaining inter-republic trade. If the EAPU proposal is accepted, there are  opportunities 
for the ecu as the Union's unit of account. This would make additional sense to the extent that the EE 
currencies were pegged to the ecu. This issue will be taken up in  Chapter 5 below. -15-
Chapter 3. Choice of the exchange rate regime 
The theory of the optimal exchange rate regime gives no unambiguous answers,  even for an 
archetypal, small, developed, industrialised market economy. The appropriate regime will depend on the 
economic objectives (obviously),  the nature and  source of  shocks,  in  particular whether they are 
monetary or 'real' and  whether they are internal or external, and the structural  characteristics of the 
economy, in particular the labour market,  i.e. real wage rigidity. The labour market is particularly impor-
tant since in the past, in certain developed market economies,  currency depreciation has only yielded 
a very short-lived benefit to the balance of  payments, since nominal earnings have kept up with-or  even 
anticipated - the depreciation-induced rise in  domestic prices. As a result there has been little reduction 
in  overall absorption and a limited switch from imports to domestically-produced goods. 
Stabilising output alone implies an exchange rate adjustment in the event of  transitory shocks originating 
from abroad or in the domestic market, unless those shocks originate in the domestic money market in 
which case the exchange rate should be held  steady (Aghevli et al, 1991, 5). The effects on output of 
positive or  negative demand shocks, from outside or  within, can be neutralised by allowing an exchange 
rate appreciation or depreciation respectively. Where the shock stems from an unplanned increase in 
the domestic money supply, the exchange rate should be held constant so  that the excess money supply 
is channelled abroad. 
Obviously policy makers are not solely interested in stabilising  output, but the implication changes if 
inflation is added, with a negative weight, to the objective function, or a balance of payments or foreign 
exchange reserves constraint is introduced. The theory becomes complicated and is not particularly 
insightful.  In  general  it  implies  that  exchange  rate  adjustments  are  appropriate  under  certain 
circumstances but the extent of adjustment will  depend critically on the nature of those circumstances 
and on the  weights the authorities attach to different objectives, i.e. the  rate should be 'managed'. 
If  the analysis is not very useful for the archetypal economy, it is even less so for the EE countries. Firstly 
the usual objective is taken to be macR>-economic stability, often taken as stabilising output. Apart from 
the point made by Aghevli et al. (  1991) that the stability of one variable risks destabilising some other, 
stability in itself must rate below growth in real incomes, low unemployment and probably some other 
macro-economic or distributional variables in the objective function of the EE  governments. Secondly 
the total economic upheaval of the EE  economies in their transition process can hardly be treated as 
simply a set of domestic shocks. Thirdly the response of  real wages to exchange rate-induced price level 
changes is not yet a  datum in the EE countries
7
•  The labour market is itself being shaped, directly, by 
institutional and legal reforms, and, indirectly, by the impact of reforms, in the broadest sense, on  real 
wages and employment. 
Even if the theory is too simple to be directly appropriate to  the EE countries, the implication is that 
additional complexities  would reinforce the argument for eschewing simple rules and  facing the need 
to manage the exchange rate. However the arguments for irrevocably faxed or  freely floating rates should 
be given a hearing. 
7 
Gylfason (1990) makes the same argument -less convincingly- for the Scandinavian counbies. - 16-
1. The irrevocably fixed exchange rate option 
The case for an irrevocably fixed exchange rate is argued by Bofinger (  1991 ). His argument stems from 
concern for the necessity of a domestic nominal anchor. With changes in the functions  of financial 
institutions, with, presumably, shifts in the demand schedules for money and other financial assets and 
with supply-side shocks of  various kinds, monetary aggregates will be hard to monitor and, in any event 
with major changes in the functioning of  the financial system, would not be appropriate targets. A  fixed 
exchange rate supplies that anchor but only, Bofinger  argues, if it is irrevocably fiXed. 
One argument against is the familiar one of the loss of a policy  instrument. It is agreed among the 
member states of  the EC that  the irreversible fixing of currencies can only take place after a  measure 
of convergence, certainly, of inflation rates. if not  also of growth in  unit labour costs. Until sufficient 
convergence  is reached the exchange rate is a necessary instrument for maintaining competitiveness. 
There is the alternative view that the  high inflation economies can, indeed will ultimately be forced  to, 
adjust without the benefit of  currency depreciation. The gains from lower transaction costs and reduced 
uncertainty will  more than  compensate for the loss of a,  at best short-lived if  not wasting,  policy 
parameter. France is a prime example of a  country that has successfully chosen a fiXed anchor in the 
form  of the Deutschemark. 
The critical issues for the EE countries are rather different: 
- an irrevocably fiXed exchange rate means that changes in the  money supply must be left free to be 
determined by the balance of payments constraint. Since financial markets are primitive in EE countries, 
and, in particular, government bond markets are non-existent, this effectively means that there can be 
no  separate fiscal policy. The government deficit is effectively determined by official aid and loans which 
are not flexible to the cyclical  situation. As a result discretionary counter-cyclical policy is  effectively 
abandoned; 
- it is  not necessarily true  that the anchor will ensure price  stability.  'The problem  is  that those 
circumstances demand a lot  more than is suggested by the current buzzword, "credibility".  Inflationary 
inertia can be caused by forward-looking expectations and a lack of  credibility, but it can also be caused 
by indexation~ by backward-loOking expectations or  by inconsistent real income claims. A totally credible 
fiXed nominal exchange  rate will deal adequately with inflation in the first case, but  in the other three 
cases it will deal with inflation by inflicting a prolonged recession and snuffing out hopes of quickly 
beginning to catch up with the West' (Williamson 1991 a); 
- it would be exceedingly difficult to predict a sustainable exchange rate - the 'fundamental equilibrium 
rate'- for the long  term for an economy in the midst of radical transformation from a  command to a 
market-based system. The concept of  an irrevocably fixed rate does not allow  for mistakes in the original 
fiXing; 
- although Bofinger argues that an unalterably fixed exchange  rate would increase credibility, in fact, if 
there were doubts as to whether the exchange rate could be maintained-which would surely arise when 
the transformation process met difficulties- credibility could be undermined. Attempts to sustain a fiXed 
rate  could lead to the expectation of a devaluation and, despite very  high rates of interest, in the end to 
an exchange rate crisis. 
Despite holding a fiXed dollar-zloty rate for  the year following the big bang, policy credibility has been lost 3) 
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in Poland. That arguably has less to do with the devaluations that have occurred  since the big bang, and 
more to -do with the inflation and the  loss of output that the initial excessive devaluation and squeeze 
on real incomes brought about. The devaluations in the CSFR and  Hungary over the last year have not 
been major threats to policy  credibility. Indeed without adjustments to keep exports competitive, and 
without the expectation that this will continue, much  needed investment in export industries would not 
take place, and  indeed the whole reform process would lose conviction. 
2. The flexible exchange rate option 
Completely flexible exchange rates are no longer often advocated, even for Western industrial countries. 
The theoretical-advantages are (i) that monetary policy can be exclusively directed  towards domestic 
targets, and (ii) that governments in any event  lack the knowledge to choose the right exchange rate. 
The counter-arguments can be summarised as 
-the instability associated with overshooting, which, with wages and prices typically flexible upwards but 
inflexible  downwards, leads to a strong inflationary bias; 
- misalignments which may last some time. An overvaluation could  be particularly damaging to an EE 
economy which must rely largely on export-led growth. And, to the argument that governments lack the 
knowledge to choose the right exchange rate, Williamson replies 'given the size of  the misalignments that 
have been obServed in the past, even where conditions for floating are better  than in Eastern Europe, 
the authorities surely have the ability  to do better' (1991a). 
Two arguments are particularly relevant to the EE countries 
- they would experience considerably greater exchange rate _  volatility than a small or medium-sized 
Western industrialised  country.  In the context of the developing countries Wickham  (  1987) argues that 
the main problem has been the absence of shortterm speculative flows to stabilise the effects of trade 
shocks. This problem would also apply to the EE countries, at least for the foreseeable future. Currency 
markets are thin.  Financial institutions which can offset seasonal or other clearly  temporary factors are 
lacking (and facilities for hedging are not  available). In add.ition the reform process is likely· to generate 
a series of  positive or negative signals, which may not be individually very significant but which could lead 
to severe exchange rate instability. Moreover policy errors would lead to the  loss of credibility in the 
reforms rather than to a loss in  reserves. The reform policy becomes hostage to the exchange rate; 
- exchange rate volatility would undermine the credibility of the domestic currency and encourage the 
use of  parallel currencies. At the very least it would make the assessment of  the competitivity of  individual 
enterprises more complex and discourage domestic and foreign investment.  ...  · 
Besides it is questionable whether the arguments in favour of floating have much relevance to economies 
in transition. The same  reason Bofinger used to advance the irrevocably fixed rate- the  difficulty of 
targeting monetary aggregates (or interpretil'ltl  monetary indicators whtn such variables as the demand 
for cash  balances-are in flulQ implies,thet the principle gain from floating, i.e. an autonomous monetary 
policy, is illusory. If the  demand for money is adjusting to structural change in the financial sector or the 
economy as a whole, and these changes in  demand cannot be monitored, monetary aggregates cannot 
be usefully targeted.· -18-
3. The fiXed but adjustable option 
If adjusted infrequently, this option combines the need for  stability, a problem exacerbated by thin 
markets (see above), with the flexibility needed to adjust to terms of  trade fluctuations, demand or  supply 
shocks or even political upheavals.  Credibility could be helped by the existence of an adjustment rule-
how specific and public this should be, or whether the  rate should 'crawl' will be discussed in  the 
following chapter. 
Whether adjustments should be sufficient to restore initial competitivity or  should aim to ratchet down the 
inflation rate by less than complete accommodation. Less than full accommodation has been the policy 
of a number of countries, France, Italy, Belgium, Ireland and Denmark, within the ERM. Arguably it is 
important during the initial stages of transformation to stimulate the  newly privatised businesses. At a 
later stage less than full accommodation may be an option. 
A fixed but flexible rate is a compromise reflecting a trade off  between inflation and the need to keep 
exports competitive and  encourage investment in export industries (which depends on the expectation 
that exports will continue to be competitive). The balance of  the trade-off is not set in stone. It will change 
over time to reflect existing inflation rates, the success of privatisation, the need or incentives and other 
factors that will  change over the course of the transition. 
4. Experience of other Countries 
The Scandinavian countries: The immediately relevant experiences are those of  Sweden, Norway and 
Finland who have pegged their currencies to the ecu - and those of  other EFTA countries who in  effect 
are, to a greater or lesser degree, 'shadowing' the ecu.  These experiences are very short. 
However the familiarity of the Scandinavian countries with pegging goes much further back (Gylfason, 
1990). The history of pegging to trade weighted baskets in the conventional way was less  than totally 
satisfactory. It did not prevent surges in inflationary expectations and the need for  frequent realignments. 
For  example the Swedish krona was devalued five times between 1976  and 1982. On the other hand 
the variability in real effective  rates was generally less than among comparable countries with  other 
currency regimes. 
The Scandinavian countries had some earlier experience with pegging to Community exchange rates. 
Norway and Sweden joined the EC  'snake' arrangement in  1972 and 1973 respectively. They left in 
1978 and 1977 respectively, having found the restrictiveness of German anti-inflation policy more than 
they had bargained for. 
Their overriding  high  employment  policy was  compromised.  Not that  their performance on  price 
stabilisation was in the least Germanic. The first oil shock was accompanied by a wage explosion in 
Norway, Sweden and Finland in the years 1973 to 1975, just when  in Germany real wages were falling 
to adjust for the worsening in  the terms of trade. 'Real wage costs rose to unsustainable  levels, thus 
paving the way for the repeated devaluation of all  three currencies during 1976-82' (Gylfason 1990). 
When it came to the second oil price shock of 1979-81, Norway was  already a major exporter and 
Finland was protected from the worst  effects through its barter arrangement with the Soviet Union. 
Nevertheless monetary policy was accommodating, although in those two countries, at least, the oil price 
hike did not create a major recession threat. Inflation in the three countries rose to more than 10 percent -19-
in 1980 and 1981, with all three countries  exceeding the OECD average in the latter year. 
These countries then moved to trade-weighted baskets - initially  with some overrepresentation of the 
dollar to reflect its importance as an invoicing currency. Gylfason (1990) argues that this  system was 
relatively -successful in limiting the variability of the real exchange rate. Yet inflation was a constant issue 
in  these countries in the decade of the 80s. 
When these countries chose to switch to an ecu peg, they chose an initial parity close to the latest market 
value. The Norwegian authorities decided to peg the krona to the ecu on October 22,  1991 with a margin 
of 2.25 percent on either side of the central  rate. The Swedish authorities pegged to the ecu on May 17, 
1991  with a margin of 1.5 percent on either side, and the Finnish  markka was pegged with a 3 percent 
margin on either side. Each of these fluctuation margins were the same as had been used under  the 
previous reference basket. 
One important aspect of the arrangements - which could be of significance to any EE countries who 
decided to peg to the ecu - was  the swap agreement concluded between the Norges Bank and the EC 
central banks. This is close to the 'very short term financing  arrangement ' of the EMS. This gives the 
Norges Bank access to 2 billion ecu of  short term funds for intervention purposes. On its part the Norges 
Bank agreed to co-operate with the EC central  banks in intervention policies vis-It-vis third countries 
(Gual  1991 ).  In addition there are to be annual meetings between the  Norwegian Minister of Finance 
and the President of ECOFIN. 
The Swedish authorities did not ask for a swap arrangement.  Sweden has large currency reserves and 
a variety of existing  credit lines. The Finnish authorities were planning to approach  the Committee of 
Central  Bank Governors  and  the EC  Monetary Committee with  a request for a swap arrangement. 
However they were  overtaken by events and the rupture of the Markka-ecu peg in  November 1991. 
The reasons these countries switched to an ecu peg were basically  the same as those presented later 
in this report in favour of such a peg for the EE currencies- the credible inflation target presented by the 
ecu, the growing use of the ecu in trade and  finance,  and prospective membership of the EMS and 
ultimately the  EMU. 
But they were also trying to make two particular points. Firstly.  their inflation performance had been at 
best patchy. All three  ~urrencies had had to be devalued vis-It-vis their baskets on many  occasions. 
They wanted to establish a new psychological frame-work - to bolster the credibility of their economic 
policy. They  would fix their currencies once and for all to the ecu and use  that link to ratchet down 
inflation, much as a number of member states have done. Secondly they wanted to give a signal of  their 
commitment to eventual membership of the Community through an  alignment of their macro-economic 
disciplines to those of the  participants in the ERM. 
Since pegging the Swedish and Norwegian currencies, which had  been depreciating slightly against the 
ecu prior to the pegging,  have remained within their margins. The experience of  the Finnish  markka has 
been less satisfactory, since downward pressures in  the market forced it to break the peg on November 
14, 1991, float  for a day and repeg at a new central rate 14 percent lower than  the previous. It could be 
argued that the markka was pegged at too ambitious a rate. Certainly there was considerable opposition 
on the part of the Confederation of Finnish Industries. Since the  markka was devalued, the Swedish 
krona has come under pressure.  Arguably delays in the implementation of the budgetary and labour 
market reforms promised at the time the krona was pegged,  together with disappointing news on export -20-
competitiveness, have  lost the confidence of the markets that the rate can be sustained. 
What lessons, if  any. can be drawn for the EE countries from the Scandinavian experience? Firstly, and 
obviously, pegging to the  ecu is no panacea. Secondly since pegging to the ecu, speculative  interest 
in the Scandinavian economies has increased. Currencies within or  closely associated with the EMS, at 
least those with 'thick' spot and forward markets, appear to attract the interests of  traders as speculative 
or hedging instruments. This, however,  may not be initially a major concern to the EE countries since 
markets  in  their currencies will remain  thin for some time.  Thirdly too much hyperbole about the 
irrevocability of  the peg will increase the loss of  policy credibility when the peg is fractured, and that may 
foster speculative attacks on the currency for some time to come. 
The developing countries: The experience of  the developing countries is of  questionable relevance to 
Eastern Europe. There are major differences in the circumstances of  the developing countries: they are 
generally not going through radical structural change; they are generally importers of  manufactures and 
exporters of primary products whereas the EE countries are in the  reverse situation. 
On the other hand there are a number  of  parallels: developing countries are  frequently subjected to  major 
reforms as part of  the conditionality of IMF or World Bank loans;  these often  include a significant 
devaluation of  the currency. and/or trade liberalisation; they too have rudimentary financial markets; and 
they are generally small or medium-sized with limited influences  over their terms of trade. 
Aghevli et al. (1991, 2) draw attention to the evolution of  exchange rate arrangements of  the developing 
countries between 1976 and 1989. The proportion of  countries pegging to a single currency has declined 
from 63 percent in 1976 to 38 percent in 1989, among whom those pegging to the US dollar have fallen 
from  43 percent to 24 percent. An increasing number of  countries switched from a single currency peg 
to a composite peg, though the number pegging to the SDR has declined. The use of  a composite basket 
has risen from 23 percent to 28 percent. However the proportion with flexible arrangements has shown 
the greatest  increase rising  from  14  percent  in  1976 to 34  percent in  1989.  The term  'flexible' 
arrangements covers a wide range of regimes,  with the common characteristic that adjustments are 
frequent. In  describing these regimes the reporting countries use such terms as 'adjusting to  indicators', 
'managed floating' or 'independently floating', though allowing the market t~ operate freely  is relatively 
rare. In fact there are no examples of  developing countries which have successfully sustained a market-
determined  floating exchange rate for any length of time. 
The increased use of  flexible arrangements has been encouraged by the increased volatility of  the hard 
currencies to which many countries previously pegged. But also such arrangements are often favoured 
because they facilitate adjustments without the political stigma of devaluation. 
These authors also compare the inflation performance of  countries grouped according to  their exchange 
rate regimes. The results for the average inflation and nominal depreciation rates of  the different groups 
strongly suggest that flexible arrangements are associated with  a rapid  inflation-depreciation spiral 
(without any  presumption of the direction of causality) while pegging goes  with much lower inflation 
(relative to trading partners)  and a  much lower rate of nominal effective depreciation. Among the 
countries with pegging arrangements, those pegged to baskets have had lower  inflation than their trading 
partners and their real  effective exchange rates have shown greater declines. 
Not too much should be read into these data. There are considerably differences between countries within 
the same groups.  Secondly the experience of  the developing countries has limited  relevance to those -21-
· of  Eastern Europe for reasons discussed earlier. Nevertheless, the record of  the  flexible regime countries 
could be seen as an objed lesson in the disasters inherent in an  inflation-depreciation spiral. By those 
(restricted) criteria,  pegging to a basket has been more successful than pegging to a  single currency. 
5. The initial parity 
Credibility can be seriously damaged by a forced change in the  exchange rate, whether from a foced 
exchange rate in terms of another currency or a basket, or with a flexible exchange if realignments are 
made too frequently and under pressure or, indeed,  with a floating exchange rate in the event that it 
collapses. 
The difficulties in  deciding the appropriate level to pitch the  exchange rate initially- as well as the 
seriousness of  the distortions in industrial structure in the CSFR, Hungary and Poland  - are underlined 
in  the work of Hare and  Hughes  (1991).  They calculate  value  added  at world  market  prices  by 
disaggregated industrial branch. They find little correlation with value added at domestic prices and that 
20 to 25 percent of  manufacturing industry actually contributes negative value added in these countries -
gross of adjustment for the cost of  capital! Clearly the lower the exchange rate is pitched the more firms 
will survive, but what has to be  judged is longterm viability. Even a branch where value added is currently 
negative is potentially a  valued contributor to GOP some years hence. An undervalued exchange rate 
(together with low real wages) is a stimulus to enterprise and insurance against adverse shocks and 
policy misjudgments, but is no substitute for vigorous restructuring (see  Newbery 1991). 
The principle that a lower exchange rate is preferable to tariffs  remains valid. The only advantage of 
tariffs is that they can be  used to protect individual sectors:  unfortunately, given the  propensity to 
interfere with market allocations, it is also their  major disadvantage. (For a contrarian position, see 
McKinnon,  1991, who argues for 'cascading' tariffs rather than a lower exchange rate). 
On the other hand if  the rate is excessively undervalued, the main arguments for convertibility-exposure 
to world prices and  the competition from foreign goods-will be frustrated. Partes  (1991b) argues that 
the rate established by Poland on January 1,  1990 was too low, and thus to some extent the subsequent 
inflation merely reflected the adjustment to world prices, while the monopoly power of  domestic firms was 
not checked  by foreign  competition.  Olechowski  (1991)  explains the  reasoning  behind  the  sharp 
devaluation- the need to compensate exporters for phasing out export subsidies and to set a margin for 
the maintenance of competitivity for the whole of 1990. 
Seabright (1991) draws attention to some of the complex of factors relevant to the choice of the initial 
exchange rate, and  whether thereafter the aim should be to keep it above or beloW  its 'fundamental 
equilibrium rate'. The choice is more complex  than a trade-off between export competitiveness and 
inflationary  pressures. For example the exchange rate policy will have differential effects on the private 
and the state enterprise sectors. These issues go beyond the scope of this report but it is  important to 
signal the rOle of structural factors in deciding  the appropriate initial level of the exchange rate. -22-
Chapter 4. The optimal peg 
1. Theoretical arguments 
A basket vs. a single currency peg: The advantages of a basket  are that 
- the domestic economy is not tied to one country's exchange  rate. which will fluctuate with policy 
changes in that country  and is subject to domestic and outside shocks affecting Hs currency; 
-it  reduces the need for foreign exchange reserves. Pegging to a single currency implies a more volatile 
effective exchange rate  and so greater swings in the external balances. At the same time  a peg to a 
basket implies fluctuations against all currencies,  including those excluded from the basket and those 
Included  though fluctuations in the latter will be damped in proportion to each currency's weight in the 
basket. 
The peg is important because frequent realignments are unacceptable since they erode the credibility of 
policy as well as contributing to exchange risk. Realignments against the peg may be based on relative 
inflation differentials between the domestic  economy and a trade-weighted group of competitors - not 
necessarily the countries represented in the basket - or they may be designed to squeeze out inflation 
by consciously undercompensating for inflation differentials. 
The choice of  weights: Between realignments it is important that  the effective exchange rate (EER) 
remain relatively stable. A  stable EER for all traders. importers and exporters. is not a  practicable goal. 
Some. exporters will be selling to single  markets. Rarely will the geographical distribution of exports of 
a single firm be weighted in accordance with the weights in the  basket. But a stable exchange rate for 
'tradeables' as a whole means that the weights in the basket should reflect the geographical distribution 
of  trade. If the cost of instability to  a firm is an increasing function of deviations in bilateral  rates. total 
trade (export plus import) weights mean that  microeconomic instability is minimised. 
Macro-economic instability can best be minimised through elasticity weights. If the goal is to hold a 
particular balance of payments measure constant, the optimal weighting system will be  determined by 
the elasticities of  the components in that measure with respect to exchange rate changes. For example 
a stable trade  balance implies weights based on import demand elasticities - such as the IMF MERM 
weights. However a general equilibrium model should in principle be used to estimate the total elasticities 
since they should take account of indirect effects working  through the factor markets. Even then there 
are conceptual  problems. What is one to do about lags in response to exchange  rate changes and the 
costs of allowing adjustment to take place  at its own slow pace? What does one do if the initial trade 
balance is not in  equilibrium? In  practice there are severe  econometric problems in  estimating the 
relevant elasticities and  elasticity weights are not a practical option. 
Other goals, such as minimising the variance of real income. subject to an income constraint, will give 
quite different weighting  systems. but Williamson ( 1982, 54-55) shows that stabilising the EER using a 
trade-weighted peg does in fact satisfy - or approximate to - a number of  alternative objective functions, 
including what he sees as the most defensible, i.e. continuous internal balance and external balance .QI1 
average oyer the medium  term. 
The effective exchange rate should then be stabilised using total trade weights. The effective exchange -23-
rate can in principle be defined in terms of  the currencies used to denominate trade.  However if  the goal 
is to maintain trade balance or  to stabilise the relative price of  tradeables, the weights should reflect the 
direction of trade. Weighting by the currency of denomination  will protect the incomes (or outgoings) 
implicit in existing contracts. But for new contracts, i.e. future trade flows, the value of  the currencies of 
exporters and importers is what matters, not  the currency in which the contract is quoted. 
The irrelevance of  the debt structure: It is for the same reason  that the structure of debt by currency 
of denomination should not  be a factor in determining the optimal peg. An illustration may  be helpful. 
Take a mythical country which trades exclusively with  the Community member states and in proportion 
to their currency weights in the ecu. However all its external debt is denominated  in dollars and its trade 
balance initially is just sufficient to  service that debt. If it were, at one extreme, to adopt a peg to  the 
dollar and the dollar were to rise relative to the ecu, to  the extent that its trade was denominated in 
dollars or domestic  currency, and with no change in trade volumes, its trade balance  in dollars would 
remain unchanged and continue to be adequate for debt service. If however it were to adopt an ecu peg, 
the greater the share of  trade denominated in domestic currency, the lower would be the trade balance 
and the more inadequate for the debt  service ·requirements. 
However this all presupposes no change in the volumes of  trade flows. In the dollar-peg case, when the 
dollar rises the domestic currency is revalued against the ecu and net exports to the Community will tend 
to fall in volume terms. Under the traditional  elasticity assumptions - which appear generally satisfied in 
practice -the trade balance deteriorates and will not be adequate to service the debt. If  the currency had 
been pegged to the  ecu, the trade balance would be unchanged in ecu terms but still  inadequate to 
service the dollar-denominated debt. However ecu-pegging would maximise microeconomic exchange 
rate stability. The  appropriate way to cope with adverse movements in the currencies  in which debt is 
denominated, if they are not shortrun fluctuations  which  are likely to be self-correcting,  is through 
adjusting, in  this case depreciating, the rate at which the domestic currency  is pegged, not through the 
peg itself. 
2. Choice of adjustment mechanism 
In two of  the three countries, the CSFR and Hungary, which are currently pegging their currencies to a 
basket of hard currencies, there is no automaticity as regards the exchange rate  adjustment process. 
Poland, as has been seen,  has adopted a  crawling peg system of adjustment. This is one form of 
adjustment  rule. The other is an overt rule that specifies an adjustment  once an inflation differential 
threshold, or other quantitative  criterion, is met or a certain period of  time has elapsed. The amount of 
adjustment may also follow a rule or be left to the  discretion of the authorities. 
Portes (1991b) favours the ex ante announcement of an  adjustment  rule. Otherwise, he argues, the 
reform  process will be threatened  by speculation and  uncertainty over the exchange rate.  He also 
argues for a minimum duration for the initial exchange rate  fixing. 
Portes does not specify the rule he has in mind. In any event it is difficult to see how an open rule would 
not be itself an invitation to speculation. Inevitably it would be known when a  change in the exchange 
rate was imminent, and then all legal  means, for example delaying or advancing trade payments and 
capital flows, and illegal, black market devices to make a speculative gain would be used, depleting 
foreign  exchange reserves even  further.  A  minimum duration for the initial  rate would  also be an 
invitation to a one-way bet for speculators. -24-
In  any  event the  definition  of such  a rule would  pre-empt  an  important element of discretion.  The 
appropriate degree of adjustment will usually represent  a trade-off between  the competitiveness of 
exports and pressing down on inflation. The timing and  degree of adjustment can be used to influence 
a particularly inflationary wage settlement or offset a rise in inflationary expectations associated with an 
outside shock such as an oil price  hike. 
The real  effective exchange rate: There are obvious advantages to  targeting the  'real effective 
exchange rate (REER)' or the  nominal effective exchange rate adjusted for differences in relative price 
performance (Williamson 1982, Wickham 1987 and references therein). Assuming that the correct staring 
point is  chosen, this will yield medium-term or cyclically-adjusted equilibrium in current account. There 
are problems. 'The pertinent price data are only available discretely and usually with a considerable lag ... 
[Williamson concludes] that the high degree of  serial correlation in  inflation rates  can  be exploited, 
together  with other available information, to make reasonable estimates of current inflation rates, and 
hence of price performance at home  compared with that of competitor or partner countries. The im-
plementation of  a reasonable approximation to this kind of  policy rule would thus be possible' (Wickham, 
p 272). 
The •crawling peg• mechanism for adjusting exchange rates is  generally justified on the grounds that 
it allows the REER to be  set as a target. However, in principal, it can be used to move  steadily towards 
any target rate or maintain a real rate once it  is achieved. A real rate target means that relative inflation 
rates have to be forecast. In practice the crawl will usually be  set at a rate estimated to offset differential 
Inflation in the  traded goods sector. 
A crawling peg implies that the exchange rate is adjusted by  small increments at regular intervals (daily, 
weekly or monthly).  The dangers of  a speculative run on the currency can be averted  by maintaining an 
interest rate differential sufficient to offset the announced rate of  depreciation (or, in theory, appreciation). 
In Poland the monthly interest rate on zloty deposits is now (December 1991) 2.5 to 2. 7 percent. On hard 
currencies deposits  it is some 0.6 percent per month while the rate of depreciation  is 1.8 percent per 
month. Thus there is a small margin in favour  of zloty deposits. 
There  are  theoretical  advantages  but  practical  difficulties,  particularly for a country with  an  innate 
inflationary  bias  (which  seems  to  be  the  case  with  economies  undergoing  rapid  and  radical 
transformation). Where the goal is to adjust the nominal exchange  rate for inflationary differentials- the 
most usual justification for crawling, the danger is that the inflationary process  becomes embedded and 
to accelerate. The crawling peg will only be  a solution to inflation differentials rather than a source of 
them  if it does  not lead  to  increasing  inflationary  expectations  and  defensive  reactions  to  those 
expectations. In general this  means that, from the start, the crawl should be seen as limited  to correcting 
past inflationary differentials and accompanied by the appropriate macro-or microeconomic stabilisation 
policies.  The duration of the crawl should be announced in advance. 
In Poland the problem of rising inflationary expectations and  defensive reactions on the part of labour 
have been dealt with by  a confiscatory tax on real wage increases. Only 60 percent of monthly price 
increases may be offset by higher money wages in  the state sector - beyond that the tax rate becomes 
confiscatory of additional wage increases. The crawl has no preset duration. In  practice the informal 
foreign exchange market is working smoothly  and efficiently and there has been no rush out of zlotys. 
The  distortions have rather been concentrated in the labour market. (4) 
-25-
In the final analysis a crawl, if it is not to be open-ended and an invitation to defensive reactions, requires 
as much judgement as to the appropriate exchange rate as does a discrete adjust-ment. This was the 
conclusion of the New Zealand authorities who,  after crawling from 1979 to 1982, later chose to put 
reliance on  market forces and switched to a floating rate (Wickham 1987). 
Between 1977 and 1990 Portugal ran a pre-announced crawling peg  exchange rate regime. For most 
of  the period the rate of  devaluation was less than the inflation differential, the real effective rate tended 
to increase and successfully bear down upon the inflation rate. However the regime had to be abandoned 
when it became  clearly inconsistent with the desired pace of disinflation (OECD,  1992). In  1990 the 
authorities were confronted with the dilemma of  trying to maintain tight monetary conditions, in particular 
to  control liquidity, faced with a surging inflow of capital attracted by high shortterm interest rates. The 
crawling peg  mechanism was replaced by a peg, within an  unannounced range, to  a basket of the 
principal EMS currencies. The CSFR and Hungary have elected not to follow the crawling peg path. This 
is probably wise, given the importance of  establishing a credible anti-inflation stance, while, at the same 
time, maintaining a  flexible stance vis-a-vis internal and external shocks. 
3. Advantages and disadvantages of an ecu peg 
A  credible inflation target: The primary advantages of an ecu peg  lie in the credible medium-term 
inflation target it implies and  the joint benefits associated with its rOle as a vehicle currency. Whether the 
ecu provides a credible inflation target is a question of  judgement about the feasible inflation performance 
of the EE countries. Tying implies an inflation target because there  is still a political loss of face when 
the currency is devalued,  because frequent adjustments of  the peg impose costs on trade,  particularly 
when  hedging  facilities  are  not available  but,  especially when,  as  in  the  Scandinavian  case,  the 
governments have  overtly nailed their colours to the mast of ERM inflation rates. 
There are dangers in being overambitious. Downward adjustment vis-a-vis the peg may give the wrong 
signals: it may be interpreted as an indication that the authorities have failed in their inflation rate targets, 
though, in fact, that may reflect unrealistic expectations which the authorities have encouraged or at least 
not dispelled. On the other hand, too soft an inflation  target has its own obvious dangers. 
It should be noted that the latest proposal by the Commission that the amounts of  different EC currencies 
in  the ecu should be  frozen  implies, that if realignments do take place, the ecu will  be somewhat 
'hardened' on each occasion. If, say, the Deutschemark were to be realigned upwards vis-a-vis the  other 
currencies  and  the number of Deutschemark in  the ecu were to remain  the same, the ecu  would 
strengthen permanently vis-a-vis its other constituent currencies and  against outside currencies. The 
inflation standard would become  closer to that of Germany. 
A peg to the ecu emphatically would not imply that the ecu-weighted inflation rate is a shortterm policy 
objective. There are two distinct aspects to exchange rate policy- establishing a  peg and the choice of 
the value, and changes in the value, at which the currency is pegged. Confusing these objectives means 
sacrificing a degree of  policy freedom. There will likely come a moment when each of  these EE countries 
will announce that its  currency is pegged irrevocably to the ecu (which may be when it  enters EMU) but 
that is still some way in the future. 
The ecu in private sector markets:  The other main advantage to an ecu peg lies in the growing use 
of  ecu in financial and commercial markets. In financial markets the use of the.ecu has increased rapidly 
in recent years. In 1990 financial paper valued  at 25 billion ecu was sold, largely in the ecu bond market. -26-
Its  use for trading purposes has grown much more slowly. However that  is likely to change (i) as EMU 
becomes closer, particularly with  the Maastricht summit setting a timetable for EMU and (ii)  restrictions 
on the use of the ecu in  particular EC member  states,  notably Germany, are eased. Clearing and 
settlements procedures are discussed in Appendix 2. However there is a 'synergy'  in adopting a peg 
currency which can also be used for trading purposes (pricing, invoicing and settlement) which is relevant 
here. If  their currency were pegged to the ecu, exporters or importers in the EE country in question could 
substantially reduce  exchange risk by invoicing (or agreeing to be invoiced) in ecus  rather than any 
specific hard currency. Ecu-invoicing is already  happening on a small scale. Of course they would still 
be subject  to exchange risk from realignments of  their currency to the ecu,  or, to a minor extent, from 
fluctuations within the currency  band. 
There will also be technical advantages in pegging to the ecu  over any other basket of currencies. The 
central banks of the EE  countries will be able to hold some ecus in their reserves from  the beginning, 
just as the EC central banks are gradually increasing their holdings of 'private' ecus (Steinherr et al. 
1991). However using them for intervention will be limited by the  extent to which commercial banks in 
their countries are able to hold ecus. This will become easier as convertibility is extended and the foreign 
exchange markets in the EE countries widen  and deepen. 
Institutional gains: In addition with an ecu peg, there are  opportunities for  establishing swap  agreements 
with EC Central  Banks and eventually the European Central Bank as Norway has done. In this context 
it should  be pointed out that Section 3.2 of the Resolution of December, 5,  1979 of the Council on the 
establishment of the EMS states that  non-EC European countries with particularly close economic or 
financial  ties to the European  Community may participate in  the  exchange rate  and  intervention 
mechanisms, though the Scandinavian countries pegged to the ecu have solve not taken advantage of 
this facility, of which the modalities remain to be defined. 
Eventual EC membership: Finally, and in the end perhaps most important, an ecu peg is an important 
witness of the determination  of the CSFR, Hungary and Poland to apply for full membership of  the 
European Community as soon as their economies are ready.  A  successful peg  to the ecu, that is 
increasingly rare realignments  and eventual stability, would be evidence that these countries  can meet 
the macro-economic standards for membership of the Community. Whether membership of  the EMU is 
attainable at the same time will depend on a set of  conditions on 'so-called' convergence. Stability of  the 
currency vis-a-vis the ecu might suggest  a macro-economic performance within reach of meeting the 
conditionality. 
It is doubtful whether these countries will be in a position to join the Community before the start of EMU. 
The Maastricht Council Meeting agreed that a positive decision to implement EMU could be taken at the 
end of 1996, provided that a  majority of member states meet the criteria of economic convergence
8
• 
These concern the inflation rate, the magnitude of  the government deficit and public debt relative to GOP 
and long-term interest rates. If no such decision is taken, EMU will be  automatically implemented form 




These are described in the Protocol of the convergence criteria to the text of the Maastricht Treaty. 
9 
The eligible states are all those who meet the convergence criteria with the possible exceptions of  the United Kingdom, 
who is not currenUy prepared  to accept the commitment, and  Denmark,  whose commitment is contingent on  the results of a 
referendum (see Louw,  1992). -27-
If EMU  were implemented before they were to  join the Community, there would be no problem of 
maintaining  their currency link to the ecu, since under the Maastricht Treaty  a smooth transition from 
'basket-ecu' to 'currency-ecu' is ensured. The continuity of the ecu's exchange rate vis-ll-vis outside 
currencies, and of ecu interest rates, is ensured (Louw,  1992). 
As suggested above, a successful ecu peg  with increasingly less frequent parity changes would both 
bring gains to the countries themselves and enhance the argument that they are becoming economically 
ready to join the Community. 
lack of  forward markets: On the other side, the main disadvantage  of an ecu peg is no less real for 
being technica1. It lies in the absence of  forward exchange markets in the CSFR, Hungary and  Poland. 
This means that traders cannot hedge any hard currency  positions. The only transactions that avoid 
exchange rate risk  are those denominated in  ecu. (Here the risk in question is that  associated with 
fluctuations of  the currency of  the peg, not dicrete-or crawling - adjustments to the peg itself.) Of  course 
the present basket pegs do not avoid exchange rate risk, but to the extent that the weights are based on 
shares of  currencies by denomination (rather than, for example, trade shares by partner country) the risk 
is minimised for the total of transactions as a  whole. 
This is a particular problem because of the high level dollar exposures - between a third and 45 percent 
depending on the country. It may be argued that, in the case of exposure in, say,  the Austrian schilling, 
the risk would be minimal as this currency moves closely with the Deutschemark. This is true to the 
extent that there is no realignment within the ecu, which cannot  be taken for granted, at least until the 
third stage of the  process to EMU. Until intra-EMS exchange rates are irrevocably  tied to each other, 
the exchange rate risk to EMS currency exposures will not be avoided by ecu-pegging. 
The structure of trade: One potential objection to pegging to the  ecu needs to be addressed. In the 
case of  countries primarily exporting homogeneous raw materials, minimising EER volatility would mean 
pegging to a basket where the weights reflected the  distribution of  world imports of the commodities in 
question  (Williamson  1982, 56).  This is  because, with  efficient world  markets in  commodities, the 
implications of a rise in the dollar for COte d'lvoire's coffee exports depends on the share of the US  in 
world coffee imports, whether or not COte d'lvoire exports  coffee to the US. -28-
Table 2: Commodity composition of  exports ofthe CSFR, Hungary and  Poland and of  BLEU, Germany 
and Spain, percentage 
Commodity class(SITC)  CSFR  Hungary  Poland 
Total exports: at uniform rouble-dollar crossrate 
Primary pdts.a  10.7  23.1  16.8 
Fuels b  6.1  4.7  10.3 
Manufactures c  83.2  72.1  72.9 
Total exports: at national rouble-dollar crossrate 
Primary pdts.  9.8  23.2  18.5 
Fuels  6.1  4.7  10.6 
Manufactures  84.2  72.1  70.9 
Exports to West 
Primary products  16.8  24.1  25.3 
Fuels  9.1  5.7  11.7 
Manufactures  74.0  70.1  63.0 
BLEU  Germany  Spain 
Exports 
Primary pdts.  5.3  6.5  17.5 
Fuels  1.5  1.3  4.4 
Manufactures  93.2  92.3  78.0 
(a) SITC classes 0, 1,2,4 (b) SITC class 3 (c) SITC classes 5-9 Sources:, Kenen (1991) from national 
sources, ECE (1991), Euros-tat. CSFR data for 1989; Hungarian data for 1987 and Polish data for 1988. 
Table 2 shows the sectoral breakdown of  trade for the CSFR, Hungary and Poland as well as for Belgium-
Luxemburg (BLEU), Germany  and Spain as (arbitrarily selected) comparator countries. There  is a 
problem in combining data for trade within the CMEA bloc and  trade with the West because meaningful 
exchange rates for conversions into transferable roubles, let alone, dollars do not exist  (ECE 1991, 
31-32). Thus as well as using the exchange rates officially adopted for  foreign trade statistics-which may 
bear little relation to the actual (and multiple) rates used to determine payments obligations-Table 2 also 
uses a uniform rate of 2  roubles to the dollar, approximately the mid-point of the range  used in the 
national data. 
The share of manufactures in the total exports of  the CSFR is just over 80 percent and for Hungary and 
Poland it is just over 70 percent. Thus these countries have been primarily exporters of manufactures, 
though the shares of Poland and Hungary at least  are considerably below those of the comparator 
countries, including Spain. The importance of primary products, including fuel, is  even greater in their 
exports to the West. Whether the share of primary products grows as these countries trade becomes 
increasingly integrated within the world market economy depends on a great number  of  factors. Probably 
the most important are the extent to which the West, in particular the European Community,  opens its 
borders to imports of agricultural goods from Poland  and Hungary. Secondly, progress in raising the -29-. 
competitiveness- price and quality-of  manufactured products is critical to  the growth of  exports of  these 
products (though the EE countries continue to face Western protectionism in clothing and textiles and 
steel - potentially some of their most important manufactured  exports). 
In any event it does not appear that dependence on exports of primary products is sufficient to dictate 
the choice of  the exchange rate regime for  these countries (though the  weights in any effective exchange 
rate peg in principle could be chosen to take into account the composition of  world imports of  the relevant 
primary  products in proportion to their importance in the structure of exports). 
Gains from a  common approach: A final advantage of an ecu peg is  that the more countries that 
choose it, the  greater  will be  the advantages to  those countries. It  would mean that cross-exchange rates 
would be stabilised and that would contribute to the  rebuilding of intra-EE trade. Assuming that there 
were no EE payments union (see Appendix 1  ), if  all or  most EE countries were to peg to the ecu, the ecu 
would likely become, in due course, the currency used most in settlement, both for  intra-EE balances and 
for balances with the West. Not only would trade transactions be invoiced in  ecus but other current 
account  transactions  would  increasingly  be  denominated  in  ecus.  Reserves  would  tend  to  be 
increasingly maintained in ecus. How quickly this process  evolved would depend on the development 
of  the ecu as an international reserve currency. Certainly the decisions taken at Maastricht will give this 
process a major boost. 
If, however, some were ecu-pegged and others were floating, or mark-or  dollar-pegged, there would not 
. be the same mutual advantages for intra-EE settlement. However individual countries might still find that 
the advantages of an ecu peg offset the  disadvantages of 'going it alone'. 
4. Further benefits from EMU 
The ecu  as  a  vehicle  currency:  Though  it is  impossible to be  certain  about the nature of the 
international monetary system post-EMU and, within that system, the rOle of  the ecu, then no longer a 
basket currency but a currency in its own right, it can be confidently assumed that the advantages to the 
EE economies of having their currencies pegged to the ecu will be considerable.  This will surely be the 
case as the ecu becomes one of the two  major vehicle currencies in international trade. The functions 
of  a vehicle currency in international trade may include (i) pricing  and invoicing (ii) finance, and (iii) 
settlement. 
To establish an effective vehicle currency for international transactions and exploit any efficiency gains, 
the critical functions are invoicing and settlement. The finance function may follow of its own accord. 
Alternatively if there were an  incentive  for trade finance to be offered  in  a  particular currency, the 
financing function could become the initial stimulus to its use as a vehicle currency. The pricing/invoicing 
function between the  EC and third countries will be increasingly effected in ecus - even before EMU. 
Secondly with EMU,  the ecu will become a currency in  its own  right.  This will sharply increase the 
incentive for the central banks of the EE  countries to intervene directly in  ecus to maintain their 
currencies in the chosen band, rather than using the dollar  or the Deutschemark. This is not possible with 
any trade-specific basket or  even the SDR. In the meantime, to maintain the ecu peg within the specified 
margins, the authorities are likkely to intervene  .. mainly in hard currencies. Since these currencies  are 
themselves fluctuating with respect to the e.cu, the process  Qf controlling the rate through this type of 
intervention is marginally less  precise. -30-
Thirdly the share of ecus in the foreign exchange portfolios of central banks will be sharply increased, 
in particular, at the  expense of US dollars. Clearly the non-EC  central banks will prefeF to hold a larger 
proportion of their foreign exchange reserves in ecus. Moreover the ecu is  likely to emerge at least on 
a par with the dollar in the inter-bank market. These two factors mean that the countries with currencies 
pegged to the ecu, holding mainly ecus in their portfolios, will benefit from a much deeper ecu market and 
from  the convenience of broad acceptability of ecus for international  settlements. 
The Assocjatjoo for the Monetary Unjon of  Europe has proposed the establishment of  a special Eastern 
European Stabilisation Fund, managed by an Ecu Zone Surveillance Board, to pool part of the foreign 
exchange reserves of  the participating countries and a stand-by facility to protect convertibility as well as 
to be used for exchange rate stabilisation. The Association's proposals are outlined in Appendix 3. 
The ecu will grow rapidly in importance as the medium for international settlement, obviously within the 
EC but also between the  EC and third countries. There is also Krugman's (1980) argument,  adapted by 
Alogoskoufis and Portes (1991), that the dollar now  plays a special rOle as a vehicle currency because 
it intermediates the financing of the imbalance in trade between, say,  France and Germany.  Once 
Germany and France are part of the same  monetary union that will no longer be necessary. 
5. Quantitative analysis 
Direct measures of exchange rate instability: Several writers  have undertaken quantitative studies 
to determine to what extent  a particular peg, usually the SDR or the  ~liar, would be an adequate 
alternative to trade weights in stabilising the EER (see  for example Crockett and Nsouli,  1977. and 
Brodsky and Sampson,  1981 ). The usual method is compare the instability of  an EER index defined as 
the ratio of the dollar value of the SDR, or  whatever peg is under consideration, to the trade weighted 
average of the dollar values of partner currencies. The method  implies that a constant EER means 
pegging to a comprehensive  trade-weighted basket. 
For present purposes this approach is of limited interest since  the CSFR, Hungary and Poland used a 
system of multiple exchange  rates, varying according to product and, non-transitively. across  trading 
partners, none of  which could be said to have significance for resource allocation. However Hungary and 
Poland·  both  maintained  a 'principal' exchange rate against the dollar  though  it was ·used more for 
preparing trade accounts than as the  effective price of foreign exchange. -31-
Table 3: Standard deviations of EER indices under alternative  pegs 
ECUIEER  SDRIEER  $/EER  DM/EER  ECU/MERM 
Hungary  0.19  0.46  0.95  0.14 
Poland  0.21  0.38  0.80  0.18 
Germany  0.58  0.68  0.56  0.56  0.94 
Belgium  0.82  0.72  0.58  0.62  0.73 
Denmark  0.64  0.64  0.55  0.58  0.61 
France  0.67  0.62  0.55  0.58  0.62 
Spain  0.63  0.64  0.55  0.56  0.60 
Italy  0.66  0.63  0.55  0.58  0.61 
Netherlands  0.64  0.63  0.55  0.56  0.63 
UK  0.61  0.67  0.55  0.56  0.60 
Finland  0.61  0.66  0.56  0.57  0.60 
Sweden  0.65  0.66  0.56  0.58  0.61 
Source: see text. Data from IMF. lnternatjonal Ejnancja! Statjstjcs  various issues 
Still the standard errors of the quarterly deviations about an  exponential trends were calculated for EER 
indices for a number of ERM currencies, the Finnish markka and the Swedish krone and for the principal 
rates of the Hungarian koruna and Polish zloty.  The denominators were the trade-weighted averages of 
partner country exchange rates used in the Exchange Rate Indexes calculated and published by the IMF. 
Where MERM weights are available they are also used to evaluate the stability of  an ecu peg. Quarterly 
average exchange rate data from  1985.1 to 1991.2 were used.  The results are given in Table 3. 
The immediately striking feature of the results is that the stability of  the EER under an ecu peg would be 
greater for Hungary and Poland than for any of the present formal or informal  (Finland and Sweden) 
members of the ERM.  MERM  weights are not  available for Hungary and  Poland,  but except in the 
German and  Belgium cases. stability in terms of the IMF's trade baskets is  very close to that of the 
theoretically-preferable MERM baskets.  The same might well hold true for Hungary and Poland. 
The reason that an ecu peg over the latter 1980s would apparently  have led to a very stable EER for 
Hungary and Poland is simply  that these countries did indeed peg their (acoounting) exchange  rates to 
a basket and steadily adjust for inflation differentials. The basket was roughly weighted on the basis of 
non-CMEA  trade. but, largely because of the importance of trade with Germany (FR). the weights were 
close enough to ecu weights and. more importantly, the adjustments smooth enough (unlike those ofthe 
ERM members) to give this benign result. 
En passant. it is interesting that there is no substantial difference between pegging to the ecu or the SDR 
for most ERM  countries or, indeed, for Finland or Sweden. However pegging to  the Deutschemark or -32-
the dollar would have meant somewhat less EER  volatility over the period for most countries 
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Correlations with the geographical structure of trade: An  alternative approach is to look at the 
correspondence between the trade shares (imports plus exports) of different countries and  the weights 
in the ecu. This is done in Table 4. 
It is first necessary to decide on the sample. First a decision  must be made whether to change the 
sample of countries as the  currency composition of the ecu changed. In fact I have kept the  same 
sample of countries - all ecu members as of 1990 - throughout to facilitate comparisons over time. The 
ecu weights are annual averages for 1980 and 1985. For 1989 and 1990 they were the weights effective 
on September 21. 1989 when the currency composition was changed. 
Secondly is trade with the rest of the world to be included as a single data point. or broken down into a 
number of data points or excluded entirely? In fact I have given correlation coefficients both including -
as a single observation - and excluding trade with other than ecu member countries. For Poland and 
Hungary correlations including a single observation for non-CMEA trade are also given. Owing to the lack 
of comparable trade data between countries where neither is a member of  the IMF. the CSFR and the 
Soviet Union were omitted from that comparison. 
10  -
In the case of Gennany, the standard deviation of  a Deutschemart 'peg' Is simply the standard deviation of  the IMPs 
EERindex. -33-
Table 4: Correlation coefficients between trade shares and ecu  weights 
1.980  1985  1989  1990 
I. all ecu member states and rest of world 
Poland  0.10  -0.19  -0.16  0.09 
CSFR  -0.14  -0.23  -0.21  -0.15 
Hungary  -0.21  -0.22  -0.23  -0.17 
USSR  N.A.  -0.22  -0.25  -0.20 
Belgium/Luxembourg  0.62  0.61  0.70  0.75 
Denmark  0.21  0.14  0.23  0.18 
France  0.39  0.36  0.55  0.42 
Germany  0.07  0.03  0.10  0.04 
Ireland  0.21  0.17  0.11  0.09 
Italy  0.28  0.19  0.33  0.33 
Netherlands  0.45  0.42  0.44  0.37 
United Kingdom  0.04  0.10  0.12  0.10 
Greece  0.39  0.54  0.55  0.47 
Portugal  0.16  0.14  0.21  0.20 
Spain  0.13  0.10  0.32  0.26 
Norway  -0.04  -0.08  0.00  0.01 
Sweden  0.09  0.04  0.04  -0.02 
Switzerland  -0.06  -0.06  -0.03  -0.03 
II. all ecu member states and rest of  world, excluding CMEA 
Poland  N.A.  -0.03  0.10  0.69 
Hungary  N.A.  -0.02  -0.04  0.03 
Ill. ecu member states only 
Poland  0.85  0.82  0.81  0.78 
CSFR  0.69  0.70  0.70  0.71 
Hungary  0.42  0.~2  0.54  0.68 
USSR  0.64  0.53  0.61  0.64 
Belgium/Luxembourg.  ·o.82  0.80  0.91  0.92 
Denmark  0.79  0.82  0.92  0.93 
France  0.81  0.81  0.93  0.93 
Germany  0.79  0.81  0.95  0.94 
Ireland  0.27  0.34  0.31.  0.32 
Italy  0.86  0.87  0.97  0.98 
Netherlands  0.85  0.84  0.81  0.81 
United Kingdom  0.81  0.83  0.83  ·0.83 
Greece  0.92  0.90  0.82  0.85 
Portugal  0.85  0.87  0.79  0.79 
Spain  0.85  0.87  0.87  0.87 
Norway  0.56·  0.43  0.68  0.67 
Sweden  0.65  0.62  0.67  0.65 
Switzerland  0.09  0.10  0.10  0.09 
Data sources:  Trade data:  OECD data bank;  IMF,  Djrectjons of  Trada aod  lolamaliooal  Eioao~ial 
Slalislics  various yea~ Ecu weights: Ungerer et al (1990) -34-
In the first panel the negative correlations between the pattern of  trade of  the CSFR, Hungary and Poland 
and the composition of the ecu simply reflect the weight of  trade with the rest of  the world, in particular 
the ex-CMEA countries. Where that trade is  excluded, as in the second panel, the correlations is insig-
nificant in the case of Hungary or, in  the case of Poland, rises  strongly over time. The jump in  the 
correlation coefficient from  0.1 to nearly 0. 7 between 1989 and 1990 is mathematically explicable by the 
more than doubling oftradewith Germany, including both former Eastern and Western sections. This may 
well be  largely be the result of revaluing previous Polish-East German  trade at much higher dollar 
exchange rates. The exact numbers  should be taken with a grain of  salt, but the trend is unambiguous. 
Taking only trade with the ecu member states, the correlation  coefficients for the EE countries show no 
particular trend. In  general they are somewhat higher than those of Sweden and Norway  -whose 
currencies are already formally pegged to the ecu. 
Over the next few years the process of integration of the Eastern  European economies, particularly of 
the CSFR, Hungary and Poland,  with Western Europe will continue. Trade between the countries of the 
old  CMEA bloc is  still  declining  and  the share of exports  going to and  imports originating  in  the 
Community is increasing.  Even a restoration of intra-CMEA trade would only temporarily  disturb that 
trend. It is important - microeconomically - that,  between discrete parity changes, the exchange rates 
facing individual traders are stable. That is the justification for a  trade-weighted basket. 
The cost of  an ecu peg in terms of  EER volatility will decline as trade links between the EE countries and 
the Community deepen. By  1990 that trend had already been established for Poland. In any event the 
EE countries cannot adopt a basket which reflects trade shares with their old CMEA trading partners. In 
the most important of those, the old Soviet Union, it is not even clear whether  a single currency will 
survive. Indeed the CSFR, Hungary and Poland have all adopted baskets which exclude all intra-Eastern 
European trade. 
I have already argued the benefits of  parallel ecu peg. To the extent that other EE countries- Romania, 
Bulgaria, the Baltic  States - and the CIS countries peg to the ecu, exchange rate  stability (in the same 
sense i.e. excluding parity changes and  intra-band fluctuations) for intra-EE trade will be established. 
An ecu peg would imply the same stability for trade with non·EC countries which already peg to the ecu 
formally (the Scandinavian  countries) or informally (Austria and Switzerland). 
6. An ecu peg for the Independent States and the other Eastern  European countries 
With the demise of  the transferable rouble, the shift to the use of  hard currencies and the moves, in some 
cases prospective, to currency convertibility, it is opportune to consider, and possibly, encourage the use 
of  a common vehicle currency, or unit of account, for trade both within the EE area and between that and 
the West. 
The pros and cons of  an ecu peg for the currencies of  the Baltic  States, the Independent States - or the 
rouble if, as seems unlikely, that survives as the single currency - and the remaining  EE countries are 
essentially the same as those for the CSFR, Hungary and Poland. From the viewpoint of  the Independent 
States,  among whom trade accounts for a high proportion of GOP, the importance of microeconomic 
exchange rate stability is paramount.  This means that the decision that all the separate currencies be 
pegged to the same basket (or single currency) is more important  than the choice of  the peg. 
At the moment in the Independent States other aspects of  the transformation process must take priority. -35-
Taking a grip of the  budget deficits and the printing press, as well as currency  reform to mop up the 
monetary overhang, are needed to remove the menace of  hyperinflation. Price reform, the liberalisation 
of  import and export decisions and a unified tariff rate are necessary to introduce some rationality through 
international prices, to give incentives to produce and eliminate hoarding. But unless interrepublic trade 
is kept up, the productive process will disintegrate. If the States opt for their own currencies, realistic 
exchange rates with a common peg for all are essential ingredients. 
Since they are not central to  the main theme of this report,  two  specific issues are relegated  to 
appendices: 
-the rOle of an  Eastern Payments Union (EAPU),  as Williamson  (1991b) calls it,  incorporating the 
Independent States of the old  Soviet Union, and what,  if any,  might be the rOle of the ecu as  an 
accounting and settlement curr~ncy? 
- a private ecu clearing system such as is now being proposed for  the EE countries, and the links, if  any. 
with pegging to the  ecu. 
- the proposals of the Association for the Monetary Union of Europe for the establishment of an Ecu 
Zone, supported by an Ecu Zone Surveillance Board and an Eastern European Stabilisation fund. -36-
Appendix 1. An EAPU and the Independent States 
There is an increasing likelihood that the Commonwealth will  break up as a currency union with the 
Independent States -or some of  them, probably starting with the Ukraine-declaring unilateral monetary 
independence. Williamson (1991b) and  Dornbusch (1991) consider that this could be preferable to the 
alternative scenario, wherein the centre continues to print money  on demand, either to satisfy its own 
budgetary requirements or the expenditure needs of  the republics. Separate currencies would  mean a 
loss in economic efficiency and a risk of an impetus to  autarchy, including new trade barriers, though 
Williamson sees  .some awareness of this danger. However the present system  threatens the whole 
union with uncontrolled monetisation of public deficits and hyper-inflation. There is no responsibility on 
the separate republics to finance their own deficits but rather an incentive to run a bigger deficit than the 
rest, since the cost in terms of higher prices and lower real incomes will be spread across the union (in 
the jargon, a moral hazard problem).  On the other hand with separate currencies, there would be such 
a  responsibility, some republics at least might get inflation under  control, some energy-poor republics 
might find the use of  devaluation valuable in dealing with the expected sharp rise to  world prices for 
energy, and, with the full range of macro-economic instruments some republics are likely to make more 
progress in reform than others. 
Dornbusch (1991) argues for an EAPU even were the Commonwealth to  hold together monetarily. The 
union would involve the Commonwealth and the countries of  Eastern Europe. However these countries 
see dangers in an payments union - a perpetuation of outworn trading patterns that in the past inhibited 
productivity  growth  and  technological advance and  retarded  integration  into  the world  economy. 
Moreover  the  CSFR,  Hungary  and ·poland  countries  have  already  gone far  down  the  path  to 
decentralising  import and export decisions - even where the enterprises have not  yet been privatised. 
Establishing an EAPU would mean a reversion  to centralised transactions with other members. 
An EAPU would not necessarily mean much savings in the use of hard currencies by those countries. 
Settlement now takes place  between the CSFR, Hungary and Poland in a variety of  ways, ranging from 
barter, through domestic currencies, hard currencies,  even to a small extent the ecu, to gold. Similar 
flexible arrangements were evolving  between these countries and the Soviet  Union until its formal 
dissolution 
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•  However the  major justification  would  be  preventing  the  further  collapse  of,  if not 
rebuilding, trade .between the Independent States and Eastern  Europe. This is much more significant 
than trade between the EE  countries themselves (see Appendix Table). 
11Russian exporters are now  ready to accept zlotys, even though they are in principle not convertible for non-residents. However 
they find that they can sell them through the informal foreign exchange 1l'1111Xet in Poland for hard currencies. -37-
Appendix Table: Trade among the CMEA countries, 1989 
Exports  Imports 
CMEAas%  USSR as%  CMEAas%  USSR as% 
of total  ofCMEA  of total  ofCMEA 
CSFR  40.9  64.8  40.9  63.2 
Hungary  35.8  70.7  33.9  66.9 
Poland  39.7  67.9  33.4  65.5 
Bulgaria  57.3  84.9  42.4  80.4 
Romania  19.9  68.3  30.5  68.7 
a: CMEA countries include those listed plus the USSR. Trade flows  between the CMEA countries are 
valued at a common exchange rate  ($0.50/rouble) 
Source: Kenen (1991), based on published and unpublished ECE  data. 
Of course, the CSFR, Hungary and  Poland all would like to see  trade with the old Soviet republics 
restored, though not at the expense of their trade with the West. They have lost their major markets for 
manufactures. Oil and other commodities from the Independent States are generally cheaper than from 
elsewhere even  when world prices are charged because transport costs are lower. 
A payments union would need a currency for accounting purposes  and for settlements. The capital of 
the union would be defined in  that currency. There are strong arguments for proposing the ecu  as the 
accounting and settlement currency. These are to some extent the same arguments as those propounded 
earlier for an ecu  peg for EE currencies. Of course to the extent that an ecu peg is  chosen by some or 
all of the EE countries or Independent States,  who are members of the union, the arguments for using 
the ecu are  reinforced. 
The main advantage of the ecu is its stability relative to any  single hard currency. The adoption of the 
dollar or the Deutschemark would lead to a bias towards. holding that currency  in the foreign exchange 
reser-Ves of the members. If they were  tied to the ecu they would prefer to hold ecus themSelves or at· 
least a basket of  currencies which, in terms of  the representation of  the main ecu components, resembled 
the ecu basket. If they were not ecu-pegged, there would still be an disadvantage in  a single currency 
with the greater volatility and exchange risk  that implies. 
There is one path that should be considered to minimise trade  distortions or bureaucratic interventions 
that might discourage  the EE countries from  membership. The CSFR,  Hungary and Poland  could 
formally join the EAPU but let the traders (or their bankers) decide for any transaction whether to use it 
for trade  settlements.  However the  use of hard  currencies  would  not  be allowed for inter-union 
settlements. Thus barter trade or payments  through the acceptance by the banks of other members' 
currencies,  as happens now between Hungary and the CSFR, would continue and expand. The banking 
systems of any pair of countries would continuously consolidate and seek to cancel out their bilateral 
balances. The banks would have an incentive to avoid recourse to the central banks, who would charge 
a  fee  or commission  for exchanging  foreign  into  domestic  currency,  equivalent  to  the  average 
commission charged on the sale of hard currencies. Thus only excess balances of  the partner country's -38-
currency within one banking system would be exchanged for domestic currency at the central bank and 
then enter the payments union's accounts. In  this way there would be no reversion to centralised control 
of transactions while the payments union would be largely neutral as regards intra-union or extra-union 
trade. -39-
Appendix 2. Private ecu clearing 
At the moment hard currency settlement is the final recourse for  intra-EE trade. As has been stressed 
elsewhere in this report.  there are a number of other forms of settlement include barter,  the use of 
national currencies. and,  at least until recently,  between the Soviet Union and various EE countries 
residual holdings  of transferable roubles (though only for a restricted volume of  transactions, which 
exclude oil). 
The Ecu Banking Association has proposed the establishment of a  ecu clearing facility for ex-members 
of  the CMEA. This would  clear hard currency positions among EE commercial banks using the  ecu as 
a numeraire currency. Settlements would be made in ecu. 
The central banks in the CSFR, Hungary and Poland are reluctant  to dictate to the commercial banks 
how trade liabilities be  settled. and are unwilling to favour any one particular clearing  vehicle. Specific 
drawbacks to ecu clearing. which have been  cited, include 
- the cost.  especially if,  as  is  now proposed.  the clearing  system  is  restricted  to  EE banks.  The 
Association of  Ecu Bankers  ecu-netting system is already used in some cases for clearing between the 
EE and Western European banks (less than  1 percent of  trade in the case of Hungary). The main 
drawback to expanding  this is the cost of clearing; 
- most banks in the EE countries lack the necessary facilities -dealing rooms etc. - and expertise. They 
are in many cases too  small to justify the necessary investments in the short run; 
-there are still differences in settlement periods and banking regulations that can be dealt with bilaterally 
but would cause  problems for multilateral clearing; 
- the participation of the Independent States in ecu clearing  seems a long way off though the volume 
of trade would supply some  of the needed economies of  scale. The republics would have to  eliminate 
the 'ticket• license system which has always regulated  the bulk of intra-Union trade as well as, on the 
Soviet side,  trade with the EE countries. 
The authorities in  the CSFR,  Hungary and Poland are unwilling to  subsidise one particular form of 
settlement. through credit  guarantees. The extent of National Bank guarantees required for  an ecu 
clearing system to become operational may be the subject of  some misunderstanding. The Ecu Banking 
Association  argues  that  only  a  two-day  guarantee  is  required,  covering  the  period  following  the 
introduction of a payment into the system. 
In any event there is every reason to expect an acceleration of the use of the ecu for commercial uses 
within  the  European  Community  and  for trading between  the Community and  the other Western 
developed countries. The ecu offers advantages in pricing.  invoicing and settlement (see, for example. 
Association for the  Monetary Union of Europe,  1990) but its use has been held back by  a lack of 
familiarity, particularly with the use of a basket currency,  uncertainties about the future of monetary 
integration, in  some countries legal obstacles and inertia. However its use will now  expand rapidly in the 
knowledge that EMU is destined to become a reality and with the strong probability that the residual legal 
impediments will be eliminated in  the near future  (Romainville 1991). Of course, where there is an 
international market with prices denominated in dollars, as in most raw or semi-processed commodities, 
invoicing in ecus may not be practicable, but it cannot be ruled out that some of these markets  may -40-
switch to ecus in due course. 
The EE countries will certainly participate in the growing use of the ecu as a vehicle currency in trade with 
the Community. Commercial banks in the CSFR, Hungary and Poland will no doubt wish  to become 
associated with the Ecu Banking Association to facilitate ecu-netting. This process would be stimulated 
by adoption of a ecu peg for the EE currencies. The authorities in those  countries will not place any 
obstacles in the way of increased  ecu clearing. 
The question remains: is there any reason to justify creating an  economic prererence in favour of ecu 
clearing? Could it be argued, for example, that such would help prevent any further decline in, or  better 
still, restore the volume of intra-EE  trade? 
In principle settlement in ecus has the same implications for foreign exchange reserves as settlement 
in any hard currency. Any  multilateral clearing system, including that implicit in an interbank foreign 
exchange market, will economise on the use of hard currencies relative to bilateral clearing. However 
in practice there may be hard currency economies to ecu clearing because the system is more efficient. 
In  particular, it offers 'same day  value'. Secondly the emerging- or about to emerge- commercial 
banking systems of  the Baltic States and the new Independent States, and to a lesser extent, Romania 
and  Bulgaria,  are  hampered  by  the  absence of technical  know-how  on  international  commercial 
settlements and might find that ecu clearing provides a ready-made and straight-forward system. But the 
costs have to be kept down through taking advantage of  economies of  scale, and it would seem that the 
same system should be used for settlements between the Eastern participants and EC banks as between 
the  Eastern banks themselves. 
The authorities in the EE countries and the Baltic and Independent States could stimulate the use of  the 
ecu clearing through  using the system themselves for commercial payments (though the  necessary 
telecommunications back-up could be a problem in the  short-term). They could also negotiate with the 
Ecu Banking Association, SWIFT (the operating agent) and the Bank for International  Settlements (the 
accounting agent) to keep the costs as low as  possible. 
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Appendix 3. The proposal to create an Ecu Zone for Eastern Europe 
The Association for Monetary Union of Europe has produced a proposal for the pooling of reserves, 
initially by the CSFR, Hungary and Poland, within a stabilisation fund which would be used to stave off 
any threats to convertibility and defend the parities of the currencies after they had been pegged to the 
ecu. These proposals are fully ·consistent with the analysis of  the main body of  this report. They are not 
essential to but would considerably facilitate the pegging of  the three currencies to the ecu. It has a wider 
purpose: 'increasing public support in Eastern Europe for economic reform by a clear commitment from 
the European Community that at the end of  the path of  economic transformation, there will be full access 
to the sing  I~ market with the single currency. The creation of  an Ecu Zone is meant to be a signal to the 
people of Eastern Europe and will therefore strengthen the political credibility of the transformation 
strategies. Seeing the light at the end of  the tunnel may make the temporary hardship more endurable' 
(Association for the Monetary Union of Europe, 1991, 2). 
The proposal envisages 
- the establishment of a special Eastern  Europe Stabilisation Fund (EESF). This fund would pool a 
'significant' amount of  the total foreign currency reserves of  the CSFR, Hungary and Poland, to serve as 
a convertibility back-up and intervention fund for the Eastetn Europe currencies. The~  would be a very 
short-term financing facility for an unlimited amount (available for 45 days and renewable only once) and 
a range of short- and  medium-term facilities,  subject to conditionality established  by the Ecl.a  Zone 
Surveillance Board. These facilities would be meant to strengthen the credibility of the commitments to 
(i)  maintain convertibility, and  (ii) defend the parity where appropriate. The facilities would be aimed 
towards short-term assistance, leaving long-term structural requirements to the IMF. 
- and the establishment of an Ecu Zone Surveillance Bo~rd  which would manage the reserve pool and 
stand-by facilities, as well as monitor the macro-economic policies of the participating countries and 
enforce  conditions of adjustment where  required.  It would  consist of a  small team for day-to-day 
management of the Zone, and a Council consisting of representatives from the participating eastern 
Europe countries, the European Monetary Institute (later the European Central Bank), ·the  IMF and, 
possibly, the EBRD.and the BIS. 
- in the event of the exhaustion of the reserve pool, intervention funds would be made available on the 
convertibility stand-by facility, which would give access to the EC central banks' own reserves or  to private 
ecus created by the EESF. 
- in cases of  fundamental disequilibria, the Surveillance Board would establish the conditions necessary 
to enforce sosound macro-economic policies. 
The benefits to the Eastern Europe countries in the form of additional funds for currency intervention are 
clear.  The costs in  terms of some loss of economic independence are also clear,  and certainly the 
Eastern European participants would want to ensure that the Surveillance Board was sensitive to their 
own particular problems and objectives. In  particular they would want to be sure that the Survaillance 
Board was not likely to bifurcate into distinct groups with fundamentally  different tradeoffs between 
. economic growth and  inflation.  ~n addition,  problems  may arise because of the different stages of 
development reached by the financial institutions in the East European countries; and divergence in 
economic performance in these countries. The proposal stresses the potential benefits of  the proposed 
system in preparing these Eastern Europe countries for entry into the Community. The body of  the report -42-
stresses this as one of the main advantages in pegging to the ecu. But these proposals go further. In 
particular they express a commitment by the Community monetary authorities to take practical steps to 
assist the gradual monetary integration of  these countries into the European Monetary System, and, by 
implication, full membership of the European Community. -43-
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